[EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)

[Diego Santos]

Jobst,

2008/10/16 Jobst Heitzig <heitzig-j at web.de>

> Dear Diego,
>
>  But randomness of FAWRB can cause institutional conflicts, especially if
>> the minority faction leader was the winner.
>>
>
> My focus has always been to decide issues, not to elect people.


 The risk of minority will remains. How does FAWRB perform in binary issues?

>
>
> > My suggestion if your
>
>> scenario exists is:
>>
>> 1. Perform simultaneously an approval election  and a PR election for an
>> electoral college
>> 2. If the approval winner has approval higher than a threshold (e.g. 2/3),
>> s(he) is elected.
>> 3. Otherwise the electoral college performs a multi-round approval
>> election until some candidate has a score higher than the threshold.
>>
>
> OK, we need a game-theoretic analysis of this. My guess is that because of
> the multi-round provision there is the danger of not getting a decision in
> any predetermined fixed time.


If a consensus exists between the factions, then this danger would be too
rare. There`s no gain for any faction to leave the issue undecided.

Also, there are probably a number of strategic equilibria and it so the
> impact of my vote will be difficult to foresee.
>
> And, what is most important: It does not solve the problem at all, it only
> shifts the threshold for overruling the minority from 1/2 to 2/3. That's
> still not nearly democratic. You may suggest a much higher threshold, but
> then I guess no decision will be made at all...


Not always we can find an unanimity...



-- 
________________________________
Diego Renato dos Santos
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