[EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)
Jobst Heitzig
heitzig-j at web.de
Thu Oct 16 12:41:48 PDT 2008
Dear Diego,
> But randomness of FAWRB can cause institutional conflicts, especially if
> the minority faction leader was the winner.
My focus has always been to decide issues, not to elect people.
> My suggestion if your
> scenario exists is:
>
> 1. Perform simultaneously an approval election and a PR election for an
> electoral college
> 2. If the approval winner has approval higher than a threshold (e.g.
> 2/3), s(he) is elected.
> 3. Otherwise the electoral college performs a multi-round approval
> election until some candidate has a score higher than the threshold.
OK, we need a game-theoretic analysis of this. My guess is that because
of the multi-round provision there is the danger of not getting a
decision in any predetermined fixed time. Also, there are probably a
number of strategic equilibria and it so the impact of my vote will be
difficult to foresee.
And, what is most important: It does not solve the problem at all, it
only shifts the threshold for overruling the minority from 1/2 to 2/3.
That's still not nearly democratic. You may suggest a much higher
threshold, but then I guess no decision will be made at all...
Yours, Jobst
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