[EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)

Jobst Heitzig heitzig-j at web.de
Thu Oct 16 12:41:48 PDT 2008


Dear Diego,

> But randomness of FAWRB can cause institutional conflicts, especially if 
> the minority faction leader was the winner. 

My focus has always been to decide issues, not to elect people.

 > My suggestion if your
> scenario exists is:
> 
> 1. Perform simultaneously an approval election  and a PR election for an 
> electoral college
> 2. If the approval winner has approval higher than a threshold (e.g. 
> 2/3), s(he) is elected.
> 3. Otherwise the electoral college performs a multi-round approval 
> election until some candidate has a score higher than the threshold.

OK, we need a game-theoretic analysis of this. My guess is that because 
of the multi-round provision there is the danger of not getting a 
decision in any predetermined fixed time. Also, there are probably a 
number of strategic equilibria and it so the impact of my vote will be 
difficult to foresee.

And, what is most important: It does not solve the problem at all, it 
only shifts the threshold for overruling the minority from 1/2 to 2/3. 
That's still not nearly democratic. You may suggest a much higher 
threshold, but then I guess no decision will be made at all...

Yours, Jobst



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