[EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)

[Diego Santos]

Jobst,

2008/10/16 Jobst Heitzig <heitzig-j at web.de>

> Dear Raph,
>
> you wrote:
>
>> The thing is that in such a case, it isn't really a single 'demos'. It is
>> two groups voting as one.
>>
>
> Do you mean to say democracy is only for societies which are
> sufficiently homogeneous?
>
>
>>  That doesn't help because then the majority on issue A will still
>>> overrule the rest in every single decision on that issue. So a
>>> compromise option for that issue will have no chance.
>>>
>>
>> You can still have compromises.
>>
>
> Only if the majority for some reason prefers to elect the compromise
> than their favourite. But in that it seems the "favourite" was just not
> the true favourite of the majority but the compromise was. So, still the
> minority has no influence on the decision but can only hope that the
> majority is nice enough to decide for the compromise.
>
>  In fact, it can be helpful if multiple issues are voted as a single unit.
>>  This allows negotiation between factions in order to make up the majority.
>>
>
> This common behavious is a pretty artificial construct to overcome the
> discussed drawbacks of majoritarian rules.
>
>  A faction can make compromises on issues that it doesn't care about
>> in order to get things that it does.  This requires there is no solid
>>  bloc though.
>>
>
> And when both factions care about both issues?
>
>  A split society will only function poorly when a majoritarian
>>> method is used. When they use a method like FAWRB instead, they
>>> will function well because then they will care what the other
>>> faction wants, will try to devise good compromise options, and will
>>> vote in a way which makes sure the good compromises are elected
>>> instead of the random ballot result. This is possible *precisely*
>>> because with a non-majoritarian method the majority cannot simply
>>> ignore the minority but has to figure out how to get them to
>>> approve a compromise that is sufficiently near to their favourite.
>>> Non-majoritarian methods encourage discourse and cooperation.
>>>
>>
>> Sounds reasonable, the problem is that a) people don't like random methods
>> b) it will result in certain outlier elements in society getting some power.
>>
>
> a) FAWRB is not a random but a very specific and quite sophisticated
> method. It only uses a certain amount of chance, just as many things in
> our life do. Chance should not be mixed up with arbitrariness. Used in a
> rational way, FAWRB will usually elect good compromise options with near
> certainty, not leading to significant amounts of randomness.
>

But randomness of FAWRB can cause institutional conflicts, especially if the
minority faction leader was the winner. My suggestion if your scenario
exists is:

1. Perform simultaneously an approval election  and a PR election for an
electoral college
2. If the approval winner has approval higher than a threshold (e.g. 2/3),
s(he) is elected.
3. Otherwise the electoral college performs a multi-round approval election
until some candidate has a score higher than the threshold.

Communication and cooperation are easier in a small electoral college than
in a large electorate.


>
>  Perhaps a threshold could be set before a candidate can participate.
>>
>
> Yes, I agree. The version I just proposed to Terry incorporates such a
> threshold.
>
>  Also, the citizens of the US didn't get to vote on the restrictions
>> of civil rights directly.  It was handled by Congress.
>>
>
> Using majority rule?
>
>  That someone was me.
>>
>> Sorry, Greg didn't include your name in his post (or I couldn't find
>> it).
>>
>
> No need to be sorry.
>
> Yours, Jobst
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>



-- 
________________________________
Diego Renato dos Santos
Mestrando em Ciência da Computação
COPIN - UFCG
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