[EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Fri Oct 3 12:23:57 PDT 2008


On Fri, 3 Oct 2008 11:45:16 -0600 Kathy Dopp wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 3, 2008 at 11:26 AM, Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> wrote:
> 
>>ANYTHING cam get tampered with if enough doors are left ajar, including
>>paper ballots (such as discarding, editing, or replacing some).
> 
> 
> True, but paper ballots must be tampered with one at a time and it
> takes many many more persons to affect any election by tampering with
> paper ballots.  Whereas electronic ballots can be tampered with en
> masse by one rogue programmer who can fraudulently alter an entire
> county's or an entire state's election outcomes.

Paper ballots can be discarded a handful or a boxful at a time.

Rogue programmers SHOULD NOT be invited in, and the real programmers should 
provide for noticing if such sneak in.
> 
> The risk is far greater for electronic fraud which is also much more
> difficult to detect and secure against.  Paper ballots are much easier
> to secure in a way that is understandable and transparent to citizens
> and far more difficult (would take a far larger conspiracy) to tamper
> with.

Agreed that unprotected electronic ballots can suffer major theft beyond 
what can happen to paper ballots.

More complete defenses are possible with electronics.

Mixed into this, Plurality is easily done with paper; better systems, such 
as Condorcet, are difficult with paper, but easily handled with electronics.
> 
> Watch this film for an education. It's great.
> http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~seclab/projects/voting/
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Kathy
-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.






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