[EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines

[Kathy Dopp]

On Fri, Oct 3, 2008 at 1:23 PM, Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> wrote:
> More complete defenses are possible with electronics.

Totally FALSE statement.

In fact there has never been even a theoretical design for an
electronic voting system or even electronic paper ballot vote counting
system that does not have known security leaks.

In fact some computer scientists just recently mathematically PROVED
that it is impossible to even verify that the certified software is
actually running on a voting machine.

You are showing a lack of knowledge in the field of computer science
by making such an obviously false, already disproven statement.

Luckily most people disagree with your incorrect opinion and another
state, KY just joined the list of states planning to scrap unauditable
e-ballot voting systems, joining, TN, IA, FL, CA, MD, and a few other
states and a lot of other counties that don't immediately come to mind
now.

>
> Mixed into this, Plurality is easily done with paper; better systems, such
> as Condorcet, are difficult with paper, but easily handled with electronics.

Well that is a very good reason to avoid implementing them - because
if they can't be easily done with paper ballots, then they cannot be
assured to be counted accurately.
>>
>> Watch this film for an education. It's great.
>> http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~seclab/projects/voting/
>>
>>

Cheers,

Kathy