[EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative

[Juho Laatu]

--- On Thu, 27/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km-elmet at broadpark.no> wrote:

> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km-elmet at broadpark.no>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative
> To: juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
> Cc: election-methods at electorama.com
> Date: Thursday, 27 November, 2008, 9:11 PM
> Juho Laatu wrote:
> > --- On Wed, 26/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> <km-elmet at broadpark.no> wrote:
> 
> >> I suppose what I want is a combination of this.
> The voter
> >> should have what he wants (which is to say, the
> method
> >> should make it more likely that the median voter
> can get
> >> what he wants), but if there is no selection among
> >> alternatives, that can't happen. In other
> words, if
> >> there is a two-party state and the parties
> don't care
> >> about your issues, you're out of luck; and if
> they say
> >> they care about your issues, only to turn around
> once
> >> elected, you have little chance to do anything. A
> duopoly is
> >> bad whether it's a political or economic
> duopoly.
> >> 
> >> So I want the people to be able to get what they
> want, but
> >> also the method to support the circumstances that
> ensure
> >> that will be true in the future as well.
> > 
> > I think this is one key to how also current
> multi-party systems could
> > be improved. Many people "hate" the party
> structure since often the
> > parties seem to be quite stagnated and deaf to the
> voices of reason. If
> > this happens in a situation where the country is in a
> stable state
> > without any risk of too rapid movements in the
> political structure, then
> > it may make sense to encourage the political
> parties/structure to react
> > better to the needs / development interests of the
> citizens.
> > 
> > Example 1. STV is a method that allows voters to
> influence very
> > freely  on which candidates will be elected when
> compared to more
> > party oriented methods. There may be some drawbacks in
> complexity
> > (especially if there are many candidates) and lack of
> structure
> > (candidates are not bound to programs).
> > 
> > Example 2. Subgroups withing the parties allow voters
> to influence
> > more on which candidates will be elected when compared
> to basic party
> > oriented methods. Expressiveness is more limited than
> in example 1.
> > Groupings are more clear than in example 1.
> > 
> > In both approaches the main expected benefit thus is
> that these
> > methods are supposed to make it possible to the voters
> to have a say on
> > what direction the political parties will grow
> (example 2 focuses more
> > on this), or allow elected representatives to form
> freely any kind of
> > coalitions (=not necessarily bound to the official and
> limiting party
> > policy) when making decisions (example 1 is more
> radical here).
> 
> I think that the second approach (that is, your first
> example) is the one to focus on, but that's probably
> because I think that parties shouldn't be made official
> parts of the system.

Fair enough.

The benefits of example 1 include
- extreme flexibility

The problems include
- the need to evaluate a rank numerous candidates if there are many of them (=> limits the number of candidates)
- some strategic voting patterns (free riding)

The benefits of example 2 include
- simple voting
- clear declaration of political position of the candidates (may be considered limiting too)

The problems include
- voter can not pick a personal list of candidates (on the other hand that may not work anyway since candidates will work with those people that they indicated to be their close allies)

Both methods open up the possibility to bring some life to a stagnated party based systems.

Also hybrid methods are possible. One could allow naming of groups of candidates, candidate specific preference lists etc.

Juho

> If the parties find that independents
> are taking the seats, or that members lower on their lists
> get consistently ranked higher, then the parties should do
> something about it.
> 
> That could fail if parties have the general power to set
> the agenda, so that they can use their power to concentrate
> their power further, in which case one might just have to
> concede and let the voters have direct power over party
> matters instead.
> 
> As for the second approach, I'll say that STV is a good
> method (with sufficient seats), Schulze's STV-MMP is
> somewhat better (if more complex), but also that it's
> possible to make better party-neutral PR methods than STV.
> If my simulations are of any value, QPQ is one such method,
> but it's that by coincidence more than anything, I
> think, so there's still room for trying to find ways to
> design a better party-neutral PR method "from first
> principles", and for discovering how to do so.