[EM] Why I Prefer IRV to Condorcet

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Chris Benham wrote:
> Greg,
> I've come to the strong view that truncation (e.g. bullet voting)
> without order-reversal  shouldn't really qualify as a (insincere)
> "strategy".
>  
> I don't see any point or use in us trying to distinguish between:
> truncation because the voter is sincerely ambivalent or has no
> preference among the unranked candidates, truncation because
> the voter's preferences among the unranked candidates are too
> weak for her to be bothered recording, or truncation because the
> voter fears being stung by later-harm or is deliberately concealing
> a clear pairwise preference in a diabolical scheme to thwart the
> election of a  shining sincere Condorcet winner.
>  
> I agree that resistance to Burying is atractive and  IRV's big selling
> point versus Condorcet methods. 

As we know, Smith,IRV is resistant to burial (hence my statement of "if 
you're going to have IRV, have Smith,IRV", since you gain Condorcet 
compliance). I also think Minmax-elimination is resistant to burial (at 
least it elects the "right" candidate in your Mutual Dominant Quarter 
example).

However, IRV is nonmonotonic. Is it possible to make a monotonic method 
that's resistant to burial? Dominant Mutual Third resistance? Dominant 
Mutual Quarter? It would give very unintuitive results, but might be 
needed if most of the electorate go "on a burial spree". I know of no 
method that actually has these properties, though; the method I called 
"first preference Copeland" was shown to be nonmonotonic as well 
(incidentally, by you: 
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2007
-January/019135.html )

(FPC is the method that, for each candidate, its penalty is the sum of 
the first preference votes of the ones that pairwise beat it. Whoever 
has least penalty wins.)