[Election-Methods] [Election Methods] Re: 3-slot ICA fixed to meet 2-candidate Condorcet?

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Chris,

--- Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> a écrit :
> Kevin,
> Your  "Improved Condorcet//Approval" (ICA) method I take attempts
> to minimally modify Condorcet//Approval(ranking) so that it meets
> Sincere Favourite (your version of  FBC).

Yes, that's right.

> http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#methica
> 
> http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#critsf
> 
> 
> 48: A>B
> 02: B
> 49: B=A
> 01: C
> 
> A>B 48-2,  A>C 97-1.
> 
> In this virtual 2-candidate election, ICA elects B.
> 
> To fix this, I suggest: 
> 
> "3-slot ballots, default rating Bottom, Top and Middle interpreted as
> approval. 
> 
> If the Top ratings winner T has a TR score higher than T's
> maximum pairwise opposition score then elect T.
> 
> Otherwise elect the regular ICA winner."
> 
> This seems to be a pure improvement. What do you think?

I would say that by taking TRs away from your favorite, so that he is no
longer the TRW, you could cause another of your favorites to win according
to the first measure, as opposed to the first favorite failing to win
according to that measure, causing a different and inferior candidate to
win according to ICA.

This seems entirely possible to me, because I can't see any obvious
relationship between which candidates can possibly win by the first method
as opposed to the second.

I'd say I'm not so worried about the 2-candidate Condorcet failure
possibility of ICA, due to the puzzlingly indifferent voter behavior it
requires.

Kevin Venzke

__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
En finir avec le spam? Yahoo! Mail vous offre la meilleure protection possible contre les messages non sollicités 
http://mail.yahoo.fr Yahoo! Mail