[Election-Methods] Strongest pair with single transfer (method)

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Chris,

--- Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> a écrit :
> Kevin,
> Soon after you raised this I asked if this met any criteria not met by
> IRV. 
> You said "no", and that it fails Later-no-Help.  
> 
> I thought it might be interesting if applied to the IRV last 3.

I have yet to come up with a good reason why this shouldn't be done. Harder
to count of course.

> 49: A
> 48: B
> 03: C>B
> 
> But now  I see that like DSC it disastrously fails  Dominant Mutual
> Third, electing
> A in the example.
> 
> So IRV remains my favourite  LNHarm method

Surely the clone-winner issue is a bigger problem?

One thing to note is that the B voters, if they can foresee what the C
voters will do, have incentive to vote for C even if their second choice is
actually A. This is the "benign" burial strategy that SPST has.

Kevin Venzke

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