[Election-Methods] Social preference ordering (was: Why monotonicity?)
juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Thu Jan 10 23:16:12 PST 2008
On Jan 11, 2008, at 6:04 , daniel radetsky wrote:
> On Jan 10, 2008 7:46 PM, Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> wrote:
> I doubt there's good reason to be optimistic about getting around
> many of these incompatibilities by changing the ballot type.
> I think you're out to lunch. Cardinal ballot methods get around
> Arrow and Gibbard, which had been interpreted as meaning "No voting
> method is fair." If that's not a good reason to be optimistic, I
> don't know what could be.
I think Arrow initially sudied social preference ordering. Loops
(e.g. A>B, B>C, C>A) in the social preference ordering are
independent of the voting methods, and they exist in the background
and may impact voting behaviour in all methods.
I don't know exactly what your targets are and how good (/"perfect")
the method should be but although cardinal methods have some
interesting characteristics my guess is that they will not offer any
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