[Election-Methods] Social preference ordering (was: Whymonotonicity?)

[Paul Kislanko]

Arrow's Nobel Prize was awarded because his impossibility proof was general.

 
I do not know what is meant by "Cardinal methods get around Arrow" - the
only way to "get around" that proof is to decide that violation of one or
more of the axioms is "ok." 
 
How do "cardinal methods" avoid the impossibility proof?

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From: election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com
[mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of Juho
Sent: Friday, January 11, 2008 1:16 AM
To: Election Methods Mailing List
Subject: [Election-Methods] Social preference ordering (was:
Whymonotonicity?)


On Jan 11, 2008, at 6:04 , daniel radetsky wrote:


On Jan 10, 2008 7:46 PM, Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> wrote:


I doubt there's good reason to be optimistic about getting around
many of these incompatibilities by changing the ballot type. 


I think you're out to lunch. Cardinal ballot methods get around Arrow and
Gibbard, which had been interpreted as meaning "No voting method is fair."
If that's not a good reason to be optimistic, I don't know what could be.



I think Arrow initially sudied social preference ordering. Loops (e.g. A>B,
B>C, C>A) in the social preference ordering are independent of the voting
methods, and they exist in the background and may impact voting behaviour in
all methods. 

I don't know exactly what your targets are and how good (/"perfect") the
method should be but although cardinal methods have some interesting
characteristics my guess is that they will not offer any clear shortcuts.


Juho



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