[Election-Methods] Social preference ordering (was: Whymonotonicity?)
jpkislanko at bellsouth.net
Thu Jan 10 23:32:21 PST 2008
Arrow's Nobel Prize was awarded because his impossibility proof was general.
I do not know what is meant by "Cardinal methods get around Arrow" - the
only way to "get around" that proof is to decide that violation of one or
more of the axioms is "ok."
How do "cardinal methods" avoid the impossibility proof?
From: election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com
[mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of Juho
Sent: Friday, January 11, 2008 1:16 AM
To: Election Methods Mailing List
Subject: [Election-Methods] Social preference ordering (was:
On Jan 11, 2008, at 6:04 , daniel radetsky wrote:
On Jan 10, 2008 7:46 PM, Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> wrote:
I doubt there's good reason to be optimistic about getting around
many of these incompatibilities by changing the ballot type.
I think you're out to lunch. Cardinal ballot methods get around Arrow and
Gibbard, which had been interpreted as meaning "No voting method is fair."
If that's not a good reason to be optimistic, I don't know what could be.
I think Arrow initially sudied social preference ordering. Loops (e.g. A>B,
B>C, C>A) in the social preference ordering are independent of the voting
methods, and they exist in the background and may impact voting behaviour in
I don't know exactly what your targets are and how good (/"perfect") the
method should be but although cardinal methods have some interesting
characteristics my guess is that they will not offer any clear shortcuts.
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