# [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2

Juho Laatu juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Fri Dec 26 02:55:39 PST 2008

```One more approach is to allow "ranked
ranking preferences", e.g. A>B>>C>D>>>E>F.

Juho

--- On Fri, 26/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km-elmet at broadpark.no> wrote:

> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km-elmet at broadpark.no>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
> To: eutychus_slept at yahoo.com
> Cc: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Date: Friday, 26 December, 2008, 12:22 AM
> Aaron Armitage wrote:
> >
> > Perhaps the voter is given an extra vote to augment
> his more strongly
> > held preferences, so that if he gives it all to his
> first preference,
> > that candidate gets two votes against all other
> candidates, but the
> > second choice gets one vote against everyone ranked
> lower. On the other
> > hand, if he gives half to his first choice and half to
> his second, then
> > the second choice gets 1.5 against third and lower
> candidates, but the
> > first gets 1.5 against the second and 2 against third
> and lower. If he
> > gives it all to third, then the top three get 2
> against everyone lower,
> > but the preferences first > second > third all
> get 1, as does fourth >
> > fifth. And so on. This would be more complicated and
> involve some
> > interesting strategic choices. At first glance it
> would seem optimum to
> > treat it as an approval cutoff. At least it would
> avoid the arbitrariness
> > of assuming that the first vs. second preference is
> more important than
> > second vs. third, and that by the same multiplier for
> every voter.
>
> The endpoint of that line of thought, I think, is Cardinal
> Weighted Pairwise. The input is a rated (Range-style)
> ballot. Say, WLOG, that A is more highly rated than B. Then
> A beats B by (rating of A - rating of B). So, for instance,
> if on a 0-100 ballot:
>
> A (100) > B (75) > C (20)
>
> you get
> A > B by 25
> A > C by 80
> B > C by 55.
>
> Use your favorite method to find the winner, as CWP
> produces a Condorcet matrix that can be used by any method
> that employs the matrix alone (e.g, not Nanson, Baldwin, or
> similar).
>
> If you want to vote nearly Approval-style, you would do
> something like
>
> A (100) > B (99) > C (98) > D (2) > E (1) >
> F(0)
>
> but that may not be optimal strategy; one could argue that
> in the same way that ranking Approval style is not optimal
> in ranked Condorcet methods, rating nearly Approval style
> isn't for CWP.
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