[EM] R/G/B/Y

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Thu Dec 25 17:03:58 PST 2008


We have many yes/no issues for which letting a compromise candidate win is 
preferable to battling for yes or no to win.

Hare I am going artificial - three dedicated incompatible positions 
(Red/Green/Blue), and a neutral compromise candidate, Yellow.  Thus we get, 
with Condorcet:
   33 R>Y>G=B
   34 G>Y>B=R
   35 B>Y>R=G

With the above intentions, voters can get the same result by each ranking 
just the first two.

I see Y as CW - 33R>Y 69Y>R
                 34G>Y 68Y>G
                 35B>Y 67Y>B
                 33R>G 34G>R
                 34G>B 35B>G
                 35B>R 33R>B

Yellow, with zero first preferences, would be welcomed if R/G/B hold 
indicated equal strengths.  These voters feel they MUST back their position 
with their first preference.  Then they all back Yellow as an acceptable 
compromise with their second preference - tHey will be MOST HAPPY if Yellow 
gets elected rather than either of the enemy candidates.

On Wed, 24 Dec 2008 12:58:31 -0500
Per [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 05:18 AM 12/22/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
> 
>> But, of course, if it were possible to elect a "no first preferences" 
>> candidate as the Condorcet winner, such a result
>> would completely unacceptable politically and the consequences would 
>> be disastrous.
> 
It would be disastrous if something other than what the voters actually 
said.  With Condorcet they could and did express this as their desires.
> 
>> The two situations I had in mind were:
>> Democrat candidate D;  Republican candidate R;  "centrist" candidate M
> 
>> Election 1
>> 35% D>M;  33% R>M;  32% M
>>
>> Election 2
>> 48% D>M;  47% R>M;  5% M
>>
>> M is the Condorcet winner in both elections, but the political 
>> consequences of the two results would be very different.
> 
I see no reason for rejecting what the voters have said - that all consider 
M acceptable, and liked best, better than D or R.
> 
> You are standing in a relatively isolated position, James. Robert's 
> Rules of Order considers this failure to find a compromise winner a 
> serious argument against sequential elimination ranked methods.
> 
>>   My own view
>> is that the result of the first election would be acceptable, but the 
>> result of the second election would be unacceptable to the
>> electorate as well as to the partisan politicians (who cannot be 
>> ignored completely!).
> 
> 
> Actually, partisan politicians voiced strong objections to preferential 
> voting systems when they "won" the first preference vote, but lost when 
> voluntary additional preferences were added in (Bucklin) or were 
> substituted in (IRV).
> 
> The electorate, however, was undisturbed, except for minorities 
> supporting those politicians. Thus in Ann Arbor, MI, the Republicans 
> arranged a repeal of IRV, scheduled when many of the students who 
> supported the Human Rights Party and Democratic candidate were out of 
> town. They won, with low participation in the repeal.
> 
> There is no substitute for the majority being organized! Which 
> organization must reach across party lines.
> 
>>   If such an outcome is possible with a
>> particular voting system (as it is with Condorcet), that voting system 
>> will not be adopted for public elections.
> 
Worse can and do get adopted.  Seems that Condorcet deserves better 
understanding.

Someone has written here against Condorcet that a candidate ranked "next to 
last" by all voters could win.  True for special cases such as only two 
candidates ranked, but not really useful.

When compared with each other candidate the CW wins more than half of these 
comparisons.  For example, with 5 serious contenders the CW has to average 
above third rank.

If a cycle, each member has to qualify as a CW relative to each candidate 
outside the cycle.
-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.






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