[EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2

[Aaron Armitage]

--- On Thu, 12/25/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km-elmet at broadpark.no> wrote:

> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km-elmet at broadpark.no>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
> To: "Gervase Lam" <gervase.lam at group.force9.co.uk>
> Cc: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Date: Thursday, December 25, 2008, 2:41 AM
> Gervase Lam wrote:
> >> Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2008 10:53:36 +0100
> >> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> <km-elmet at broadpark.no>
> >> Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a
> serious alternative 2
> > 
> > Sorry.  I have not been following this lengthy thread
> carefully.  Just
> > been taking in the bits that I find
> 'interesting.'
> > 
> >> most PR systems have a threshold (either implicit
> or explicit). Perhaps real world implementation of Condorcet
> systems would have a "first preference" threshold,
> either on candidates or on sets: anyone getting less than x%
> FP is disqualified.
> > 
> > Either that or have IRV with a different candidate
> elimination method
> > (i.e. not the one with the least number of top votes)?
>  I dunno.
> 
> Or, as someone else proposed, a Condorce method where A
> > B, for all B,  is weighted to some multiple if A is the
> first preference.
> 

Perhaps the voter is given an extra vote to augment his more strongly
held preferences, so that if he gives it all to his first preference,
that candidate gets two votes against all other candidates, but the
second choice gets one vote against everyone ranked lower. On the other
hand, if he gives half to his first choice and half to his second, then
the second choice gets 1.5 against third and lower candidates, but the
first gets 1.5 against the second and 2 against third and lower. If he
gives it all to third, then the top three get 2 against everyone lower,
but the preferences first > second > third all get 1, as does fourth >
fifth. And so on. This would be more complicated and involve some
interesting strategic choices. At first glance it would seem optimum to
treat it as an approval cutoff. At least it would avoid the arbitrariness
of assuming that the first vs. second preference is more important than
second vs. third, and that by the same multiplier for every voter.