[EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2

Gervase Lam gervase.lam at group.force9.co.uk
Wed Dec 24 09:08:33 PST 2008

> Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2008 10:53:36 +0100
> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km-elmet at broadpark.no>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2

Sorry.  I have not been following this lengthy thread carefully.  Just
been taking in the bits that I find 'interesting.'

> most PR systems have a threshold (either 
> implicit or explicit). Perhaps real world implementation of Condorcet 
> systems would have a "first preference" threshold, either on candidates 
> or on sets: anyone getting less than x% FP is disqualified.

Either that or have IRV with a different candidate elimination method
(i.e. not the one with the least number of top votes)?  I dunno.

>  If it's 
> directly on candidates, that isn't cloneproof, but if it's done on sets, 
> it could be. On the other hands, doing it on sets could preserve the 
> complaints, and in a completely polarized world, it would be a problem.
> For instance,
> 49: Faction A controls nation > Compromise > Faction B controls nation
> 48: Faction B controls nation > Compromise > Faction A controls nation
>   2: Compromise > Faction A controls nation = Faction B controls nation
> That's kinda contrived, but if either A or B wins, there'll be big trouble.

Doesn't this depend on how good Compromise is?  It is impossible to tell
just from the above.


More information about the Election-Methods mailing list