[EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2

James Gilmour jgilmour at globalnet.co.uk
Wed Dec 24 04:33:53 PST 2008

Kristofer Munsterhjelm  > Sent: Wednesday, December 24, 2008 9:54 AM
> Perhaps real world implementation of Condorcet 
> systems would have a "first preference" threshold, either on candidates 
> or on sets: anyone getting less than x% FP is disqualified.

I have not seen any advocate of Condorcet make such a suggestion, but it has been made for IRV, though not taken up by any serious
IRV advocates, so far as I am aware.

The weak Condorcet winner is, in my view, the political Achilles' heel of the Condorcet voting system.  The corresponding political
defect in IRV is that it can eliminate a Condorcet winner (whether that is common or not is irrelevant  -  it is possible).  But we
know from experience that real electors and real politicians will accept that political defect in IRV  -  evidence: IRV has been
used for public elections for many decades in several countries.  In contrast, despite having been around for about 220 years, the
Condorcet voting system has not been used in any public elections anywhere, so far as I am aware.  That could perhaps change if a
threshold were implemented to exclude the possibility of a weak Condorcet winner AND if a SIMPLE method were agreed to break
Condorcet cycles.

No virus found in this outgoing message.
Checked by AVG - http://www.avg.com 
Version: 8.0.176 / Virus Database: 270.10.0/1862 - Release Date: 23/12/2008 12:08

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list