[EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Sat Dec 20 19:51:16 PST 2008

On Sat, 20 Dec 2008 19:19:02 -0000 James Gilmour wrote:
> Abd ul-Rahman Lomax   > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2008 12:42 AM
> I don't have time to read any of the extended essays that now feature on this list, but these two remarks in a recent post caught my
> eye and I could not let them pass.
Responding to one thought for IRV vs C (Condorcet):
> Reflecting the diversity of voters' views is, of course, impossible when a single winner is required in a single-office election
> (e.g. city mayor, state governor).  In this situation there MAY be a case for suggesting that one of the purposes of the public
> election should be to simulate compromise.  However, even then, most of our voters would expect the winner to be the candidate who
> has a majority of the first preferences even if some other candidate had greater overall "compromise" support, i.e. they would
> expect LNH to apply and operate.  When there is no majority winner they may well be prepared to take a compromising view, but there
> are some very real difficulties in putting that into effect for public elections.

Given that a majority of first preferences name Joe, IRV and C will agree 
that Joe wins.

Given four others each getting 1/4 of first preferences, and Joe getting a 
majority of second preferences:
      IRV will award one of the 4, for it only looks at first preferences 
in deciding which is a possible winner.
      C will award one of the 5.  Any of them could win, but Joe is 
stronger any outside the 5.
> James Gilmour
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.

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