[EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 1
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-elmet at broadpark.no
Fri Dec 5 07:37:44 PST 2008
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> But want simple and maximally powerful? Asset Voting. Terminally simple
> as a voting method. Ideal strategy: identify the eligible person (could
> be yourself!) whom you most trust to make a good decision in your
> absence, because you will be absent, as a voter, until the next
> election. Vote for that person, period. There is no reason to vote for
> anyone else, at all. Can't decide between two? Vote for both, the system
> will divide your vote between them. But I suggest that only to avoid
> tossing out the vote, I see no other reason to put that in. We are
> deciding *representation*, not a final decision. If we were limited to a
> small candidate set, then we'd want to be able to create virtual
> committees by voting for more than one. But we need not be limited to
> such a small candidate set.
>
> The persons receiving votes in Asset become public voters, I usually
> call them electors. There are a lot of uses for this, and it goes far
> beyond single winner elections. Asset was first designed as a tweak to
> STV, by Lewis Carroll, to deal with the very serious problem of
> exhausted ballots. It was a much better fix than the Australian one of
> requiring full ranking, which essentially coerces votes out of people
> who don't have the knowledge to do deep ranking. And who clearly would
> rather not, as we see where full ranking is optional, as with
> Queensland, for example.
Something I've always wondered about Asset Voting. Say you have a very
selfish electorate who all vote for themselves (or for their friends).
From what I understand, those voted for in the first round become the
electors who decide among themselves who to pick for the final decision.
Wouldn't this produce a very large "parliament"?
Perhaps the situation that the voters vote for themselves is unlikely,
but some of the problem remains. Asset's advantage is supposed to be
(again, as far as I understand it) that it involves more people than
would be directly elected. So if it involves too few, that's a problem,
but if it involves too many, that's a problem as well because the
deliberative process doesn't scale.
How's that solved?
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