[EM] "CDTT criterion" compliance desirable?
Chris Benham
cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au
Tue Dec 23 04:35:10 PST 2008
Marcus,
In one of your recent papers and on the Schulze method Wikipedia
page you list "Woodall's CDTT criterion" as one of the criteria
satisfied by the Schulze (Winning Votes) method.
What, in your opinion, is supposed to be the positive point of compliance
with that criterion? In other words, how would Schulze(WV) be worse
if it satisfied all the criteria presently on your list of satisfied criteria
except that one?
Chris Benham
PS: For those who might not know, the "CDTT criterion" presumably
says that the winner must come from the CDTT set, explained below
by Kevin Venzke.
http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#methcdtt
The CDTT is a set of candidates defined by Woodall to include every
candidate A such that, for any other candidate B, if B has a majority-strength
beatpath to A, then A also has a majority-strength beatpath back to B.
(See Schulze for a definition of a beatpath.) Another definition (actually, the
one Woodall chooses to use) of the CDTT is that it is the union of all minimal
sets such that no candidate in each set has a majority-strength loss to any
candidate outside this set. (Candidate A has a "majority-strength loss" to
candidate B if v[b,a] is greater than 50% of the number of cast votes.)
Markus Schulze proposed this set earlier, in 1997. His wording was to take the
Schwartz set resulting from replacing with pairwise ties, all pairwise wins with
under a majority of the votes on the winning side.
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