[EM] Why I Prefer IRV to Condorcet

Chris Benham cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au
Wed Dec 10 11:17:21 PST 2008


Kristofer,

You wrote (Sun.Nov.23):
"Regarding number two, simple Condorcet methods exist. Borda-elimination 
(Nanson or Raynaud) is Condorcet. Minmax is quite simple, and everybody 
who's dealt with sports knows Copeland (with Minmax tiebreaks). I'll 
partially grant this, though, since the good methods are complex, but 
I'll ask whether you think MAM (Ranked Pairs(wv)) is too complex. In 
MAM, you take all the pairwise contests, sort by strength, and affirm 
down the list unless you would contradict an earlier affirmed contest. 
This method is cloneproof, monotonic, etc..."

Raynaud isn't  Borda-elimination.  It is  Pairwise Elimination, i.e. eliminate
the loser of  the most decisive or strongest pairwise result (by one measure or
another) until one candidate remains.  You may have instead meant to write 
"Baldwin",though some sources just talk about 2 different versions of  Nanson.

Simpler and much better than any of those methods are  Condorcet//Approval
and  Smith//Approval and  Schwartz//Approval ,in each case interpreting 
ranking as approval and so not allowing ranking among unapproved candidates.

Chris Benham


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