[EM] Why I Prefer IRV to Condorcet
Chris Benham
cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au
Wed Dec 10 11:17:21 PST 2008
Kristofer,
You wrote (Sun.Nov.23):
"Regarding number two, simple Condorcet methods exist. Borda-elimination
(Nanson or Raynaud) is Condorcet. Minmax is quite simple, and everybody
who's dealt with sports knows Copeland (with Minmax tiebreaks). I'll
partially grant this, though, since the good methods are complex, but
I'll ask whether you think MAM (Ranked Pairs(wv)) is too complex. In
MAM, you take all the pairwise contests, sort by strength, and affirm
down the list unless you would contradict an earlier affirmed contest.
This method is cloneproof, monotonic, etc..."
Raynaud isn't Borda-elimination. It is Pairwise Elimination, i.e. eliminate
the loser of the most decisive or strongest pairwise result (by one measure or
another) until one candidate remains. You may have instead meant to write
"Baldwin",though some sources just talk about 2 different versions of Nanson.
Simpler and much better than any of those methods are Condorcet//Approval
and Smith//Approval and Schwartz//Approval ,in each case interpreting
ranking as approval and so not allowing ranking among unapproved candidates.
Chris Benham
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