[EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines

[Kathy Dopp]

>   4. Re: Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines (Dave Ketchum)
> On Sun, 17 Aug 2008 11:14:34 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>> Dave Ketchum wrote:
> I DO NOT like printout-based machines.  To start some thinking, how about:
>      All machines have identical valid code,
>      Some have video cameras recording the ballot as the voter
> submits it.
>      Voters choose which machines to vote on.
>      Audit that tapes prove 100% correctness of those machines taped
> - BETTER be.


Just a few objections come to mind for that "solution" David:

1. potentially violates voter privacy
2. video can be digitally altered, segments deleted (is more volatile
than paper ballots)
3. another expensive toy (video cameras) that would have to be kept
running during elections, & maintained between elections, tested,
certified, etc.
4. auditing video tapes would be much slower (more administratively
burdensome) than auditing paper ballots
5. selecting the machines to be videotaped prior to the election tells
any inside fraudsters which machines can be undetectably tampered with
or have their votes altered during or after the election  (valid
auditing requires only selecting the random audit units AFTER all the
auditable vote counts have been publicly posted after the polls close
(as in any field, the data must be committed prior to auditing it)

A response giving more details of why election integrity advocates
oppose such video systems is included in this post that I wrote upon
request of the Election Defense Alliance:

http://electionarchive.org/ucvInfo/US/legislation/S3212BennettFeinsteinBill2008.pdf

Cheers,

Kathy