[EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines

[Dave Ketchum]

On Thu, 21 Aug 2008 16:37:32 -0600 Kathy Dopp wrote:
>>  4. Re: Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines (Dave Ketchum)
>>On Sun, 17 Aug 2008 11:14:34 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>>
>>>Dave Ketchum wrote:
>>
>>I DO NOT like printout-based machines.  To start some thinking, how about:
>>     All machines have identical valid code,
>>     Some have video cameras recording the ballot as the voter
>>submits it.
>>     Voters choose which machines to vote on.
>>     Audit that tapes prove 100% correctness of those machines taped
>>- BETTER be.
> 
> 
> 
> Just a few objections come to mind for that "solution" David:
      First, this is not intended to be used in a zillion precincts - 
just to validate the programs.
      But part of the requirement on the program installation is that 
it be impractical to alter it undetectably.
> 
> 1. potentially violates voter privacy
      That is the reason for letting voters CHOOSE whether to 
volunteer for this.

> 2. video can be digitally altered, segments deleted (is more volatile
> than paper ballots)
      So there needs to be extra effort to avoid such.

> 3. another expensive toy (video cameras) that would have to be kept
> running during elections, & maintained between elections, tested,
> certified, etc.
      Sounds like overkill.  What more is needed than cameras that can 
be borrowed for use as needed?

> 4. auditing video tapes would be much slower (more administratively
> burdensome) than auditing paper ballots
      "Auditing" is not clear to me - must read all the ballots off 
the tape - part of deciding how many voting machines to do this on.

> 5. selecting the machines to be videotaped prior to the election tells
> any inside fraudsters which machines can be undetectably tampered with
> or have their votes altered during or after the election  (valid
> auditing requires only selecting the random audit units AFTER all the
> auditable vote counts have been publicly posted after the polls close
> (as in any field, the data must be committed prior to auditing it)
      Then I am not proposing auditing as such.
      The programs used need to make fraud difficult, and undetectable 
fraud VERY difficult, wherever used, whether or not a particular 
machine is taped.

Again, my purpose is validating a program, rather than a particular 
election.
> 
> A response giving more details of why election integrity advocates
> oppose such video systems is included in this post that I wrote upon
> request of the Election Defense Alliance:
> 
> http://electionarchive.org/ucvInfo/US/legislation/S3212BennettFeinsteinBill2008.pdf
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Kathy
-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.