[Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there'reonly 2 factions

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Abd ul-Rahman,

>> > I dislike, by the way, describing voters as selfish if they vote in
>> > their own interest. That's the default, they *should* vote in their
>> > own interest.
>>
>> That is probably a language problem again. I thought "selfish" was a 
>> synonym for "acting in my own interest only", is it not? However, the 
>> latter was what I meant to say.
>
> Yes, it is a synonym for that. However, the implication here is that 
> not only is one acting in one's own self-interest, it is a narrow self 
> interest that does not care if nearly half the electorate ends up with 
> a maximally unsatisfactory outcome, as long as they personally gain a 
> dime. This is actually sociopathy, someone who truly thinks like this 
> and who is not afraid of consequences would slit your throat for 
> pocket change.

And yet you think "they *should* vote in their own interest"?

> In a Range poll, social utility is maximized if everyone votes 
> *absolute* utilities, accurately. 

Only if "social utility" is defined so that your statement becomes true 
by definition (and becomes a triviality thus). Welfare economics, 
however, does not define "social utility" as the sum of individual 
utility, it rather defines "social welfare" in some more sophisticated 
ways which we already discussed earlier several times.

>> > What I ended up suggesting was that the problem is resolved if the
>> > voters negotiate. It's possible to set up transfers of value (money?)
>> > such that the utilities are equalized, and that the benefit of
>> > selecting C is thus distributed such that the A voters do *not* lose
>> > by voting for C. If they vote for A, they get A but no compensation.
>> > If they vote for C, they get C plus compensation. If the utilities
>> > were accurate -- Juho claimed that they were *not* utilities, but
>> > that then makes the problem incomprehensible in real terms -- then
>> > overall satisfication is probably optimized by the choice of C with
>> > compensation to the A voters, coming from the C voters. Certainly the
>> > reverse is possible, that is, the A voters could pay the C voters
>> > compensation to elect A, but it would have to be much higher 
>> compensation!
>>
>> I understood this. But I consider it quite absurd that the A voters 
>> should be "compensated" for anything.
>
> This is because you refuse to look at the underlying utilities. 
> Because you don't believe in utility, in particular in *commensurable* 
> utilities, you have only preference left, and from the raw preferences 
> it appears that C is the best compromise.

I love to look at utilities. I did just that to infer that C is a good 
compromise in the example I gave. By the same reasoning (which I will 
not repeat again here) it also follows that C would be *no* good 
compromise had the ratings been
55 voters: A 100, C 20, B 0
45 voters: B 100, C 20, A 0
Do you still think only the rankings matter? I don't and never did.

>
> Indeed, if that is all the information we have, C is the best compromise.
>
> But what has been overlooked, which is precisely what makes the 
> arguments about compensation mysterious to Jobst, is that compromise 
> means that all parties lose something, compared to the ideal for them.

Yes, *all* parties, that's exactly the point! So no one of them has to 
compensate the other, since neither can hope to get their will for 
certain. They have to compromise. After all, that's what societies are 
about. By the way, compensation is no mystery at all for me, it is 
simply not justified in the situation at hand.

> Suppose it is realized before the election that B is not a viable 
> candidate, and we do not consider B at all. What we have left is
>
> 55: A>C
> 45: C>A
>
> What is the optimal outcome? For ranked methods, it is obvious. 

You think so? May I assume then that your "obvious" best outcome is the 
same as mine, namely electing A with 55% probability and C with 45%? 
Because this would make it quite attractive to all of them to search for 
a compromise that all would like better than this lottery.

(This is how far I got into your post.)

Yours, Jobst

> For Range and selfish voters, it is also obvious. Only the 
> introduction of the irrelevent candidate makes it appear not obvious.
>
> But we do have more information than the ranks. *If* we assume 
> commensurable utilities in the original votes, then we can say much 
> more. There is a relative preference strength, commensurable, of 
> 100:80 for the A voters and 80:0 for the original B voters.
>
> The majority has a weak preference and the minority a strong one. 
> There is a complication, if this is a real election. The majority will 
> have reduced motivation to turn out, so if we actually get a 55:45 
> preference in the  final poll, the *real* preference would be greater 
> than that, generally. Forcing all voters to turn out warps elections 
> unnaturally, causing true weak preference to become equal to strong 
> preference.
>
> The common argument that strong preference is somehow selfish is 
> seriously flawed, because true knowledge will cause strong preference. 
> The *knowledgeable* may have a weak preference when they understand 
> the complexity of a situation, but they will have have a strong 
> preference when they see clearly. Forcing complete voter turnout 
> *seems* like it will make results more "democratic," but, in fact, it 
> amplifies the effect of media manipulation of voters, since this 
> manipulation is more effective with those who care less, who are not 
> motivated to research and reflect deeply.
>
> In any case, consider the result shown above. Why should we choose C?
>
> Well, what if there were a free negotiation between the A voters and 
> the C voters. At an appropriate transfer of value (*no presumption 
> exists that it is from C to A, it could be the reverse*), and if the 
> two factions were uniform, the vote would be come unanimous, and, 
> because the S.U. winner will optimize overall value to society, it is 
> highly likely that the transfer would be from the C voters to the A 
> voters.
>
> But it could be in the other direction; however, that would make sense 
> only if the commensurable utilities were different than stated. This 
> is why I wrote about a transfer from the B voters to the A voters.
>
> Consider the possibility that the B voters are rich and the A voters 
> are poor. The A voters need that extra value more than the B voters. 
> The transfer suggested by the commensurable utilities does not 
> consider this, it simply equalizes the benefit from the result of 
> choosing C, spreading it uniformly acrcoss society instead of 
> selectively benefiting one faction.
>
> The theory of this, that allows such unequal benefit, is justified by 
> the assumption that over many elections, the value is spread. But that 
> assumption is clearly accepting an unsatisfactory solution, perhaps 
> because the negotiations are considered too complicated or difficult. 
> It is *not* because they would be unjust, no, they would be 
> *accurately* just.
>
> This has become, from this discussion, crystal clear to me. "Tyranny 
> of the majority" applies, really, to any decision made by less than 
> consensus. A truly just system would equalize benefit from all 
> decisions -- or, more accurately, it would link decisions such that 
> benefit is equalized. The decision to build the public facility at C 
> is a separate one from the decision that the residents of neighborhood 
> B would be taxed more to compensate for the increased convenience to 
> them, but a negotiation would link the two decisions -- and perhaps 
> would substitute a voluntary offer in compromise, made in escrow, for 
> a tax.
>
> It makes sense for the C voters to offer to compensate the A voters 
> for their relinquishment of their preference; and the most just 
> compensation is one which equalizes benefit, such that all equally 
> benefit from the result of the election.
>
> The beautiful thing about the negotiation is that it equalizes 
> utilities *without* having to use commensurable utilities in a Range 
> election. The negotiation shifts utilities until all votes will vote, 
> in their own self-interest, for the best compromise.
>
> That C is even called the "compromise" candidate shows that Jobst 
> recognizes that there is a loss. Is the loss shared equally? This 
> could also be stated in term of differential gain, but, in fact, the 
> term for this is "utility."
>
> It is fashionable to state, "I don't believe in utilities," but if we 
> look at what this could rationally mean, it must mean, not that there 
> are no utilities, but that it is impossible to measure them in a way 
> that makes them useful. Opponents of Range Voting are claiming that 
> the distortions of strategy (including the necessary "strategy" or 
> algorithm used to convert utilities to votes) make utilities useless.
>
> But, in fact, that is an assertion that I have never seen proven. 
> Rather, we can study election methods by positing utilities and seeing 
> how they behave with various distributions of utilities among voters. 
> Essentially, there is a Utility Measure that evaluates election 
> methods based on how often they choose the S.U. maximizer, and, 
> properly, when they do not, how great the loss of utility is. This is 
> the work that Warren Smith has done.
>
> It does *not* mean that utilities are actually used by the method. 
> Rather, posited absolute utilities are used to create voting patterns, 
> based on various strategies, and the method deals only with the voting 
> patterns.
>
> However, there can be circumstances with elections where the utilities 
> become known. And free negotiations to compensate voters for voting a 
> certain way, can discover absolute utilities. If there is no secret 
> ballot, it becomes relatively simple, but various devices can be used 
> when there is secret ballot, and vote buying -- which, as it has 
> existed, is a form of corruption -- should become a nonissue.
>
> (What is offensive about vote buying is when it is secret and used to 
> shift an election result, with compensation only to a few voters; such 
> buying does *not* equalize benefits, rather it distorts them even 
> further. Suppose the B voters get together to make an offer to a 
> selected subset of the A voters, just 6% of the electorate. This would 
> cost them less than compensating all the A voters. Even if they paid 
> these voters double the fair equalization, they would be ahead. A 
> subset of the A voters, about 10%, gains all the benefit of the 
> compensation, and the rest of them are uncompensated. In practical 
> terms, however, it would be difficult to keep such an offer secret 
> with such a large group, and so such a secret manipulation would only 
> make sense if the gap between the A and B factions was smaller. There 
> remain implications unexplored here.)
>
>>  This would be only justified if something was taken from them which 
>> in a sense belonged to them rightfully.
>
> That is correct. And something is is taken which is legitimately 
> theirs, which is an equal share of the benefits of social 
> decision-making. other things being equal. We routinely accept 
> inequality in this, but that does not mean that it is just to do so.
>
> (Other things being equal means that, for example, all are paying the 
> same taxes. Note that I gave a real-world example of equalization, it 
> seems that all this has been wasted on Jobst. Equalization works and 
> is recognized as just by those participating in it, including those 
> who pay, effectively, to the others.)
>
>>  What my arguing is all about is that I don't think the A voters have 
>> such a right to the certain election of A, at most one could perhaps 
>> say the have a right to A getting at least 55% winning probability.
>
> Jobst gets here by assuming that it is a given that the A voters are 
> going to participate in this society, that they are not going to walk, 
> presumably because they will not be allowed to.
>
> What he is doing is presuming fixed election outcomes, that cannot be 
> modified to make them agreeable to all. He is assuming that consensus 
> is impossible to obtain. The kind of negotiations I mentioned are free 
> ones, and the negotiation is deliberative process. Election methods 
> are dangerous because they bypass deliberative process, and this must 
> be understood to understand the theory of elections. The problem of 
> deliberation, the difficulty of it, appears when the scale is large, 
> and because we have not developed the mechanisms which would make 
> large-scale negotiations practical. But even if we accept that they 
> are impractical -- and I believe that they *are* practical, and I 
> believe I understand how it could be done, FA/DP -- this would not 
> make them and their results unjust. His argument is that it would be 
> unjust; what he wishes to do is to impose some system on this 
> electorate that would *force* the A voters to accept the loss of their 
> preference.
>
> But if we look at a small group with similar underlying utilities, 
> even two people with A>C and C>A preferences, and we insist upon 
> consensus in order to make any decision at all -- which becomes much 
> more necessary when there are two people! -- the matter becomes clear. 
> Would we think that these people should make the choice by lottery?
>
> Sure, if there is no better way. If they cannot, for some reason, 
> negotiate with each other. If the utilities are not equal, one side or 
> the other is going to, relatively speaking, lose. What is *normal* in 
> social interaction, however is that some negotiation takes place. It 
> may be a very informal one, based on something like "Well see your 
> favorite movie this time and mine next time," or it may be quite 
> formal, a contract that states, "You will do this and I will pay you 
> that." It is *routine*. But Jobst, looking it through some very narrow 
> slits, sees only the decision-making process, with restricted options, 
> and no possibility of any compensation or negotiation that would make 
> the result equally satisfactory to everyone.
>
> This way of thinking is common, it is a major obstacle to true reform. 
> There are probably hundreds of held concepts that interfere with clear 
> thinking about our situation, and it takes time to dismantle them.
>
> But we are doing it. I see great progress over the last few years, and 
> it is accelerating. The necessary insights are becoming more common.
>
> http://www.bobdylan.com/songs/times.html
>
>
>>  So, if they would prefer to have A with 55% and B with 45% over 
>> having C with 100%, only then one could perhaps argue that they 
>> should be compensated if C was to be elected with certainty.
>
> But that is exactly what is being proposed. The A voters are 
> compensated in order to make the election of C certain. It's certain 
> if they all agree!
>
> The lottery analysis is one which tests normalized utilities, not 
> absolute ones. That's its defect. It works if the range of the A 
> voters and the B voters is equal, such that the preferences stated are 
> commensurable.
>
> I'm not sure I've seen a precise description of how the lottery would 
> work, though, and perhaps I don't understand it. What I see, however, 
> is that an election run in this way, with real utilities underneath, 
> leaves part of the electorate with a different benefit than another 
> part. Only one outcome can be chosen, we assume, so what we are trying 
> to do is choose the one which does the least damage -- or produces the 
> most *overall* benefit, without caring how this is distributed. This 
> can fail rather badly if it creates even a small minority which is 
> highly dissatisfied, they can start to sabotage the society. Even tiny 
> minorities, highly motivated, can do a lot of damage! Think Shining Path.
>
> Spreading out the benefits of social organization such that all 
> benefit from it equally -- at least roughly -- actually should benefit 
> all.
>
> It is in our common interest to avoid the tragedy of the commons, a 
> tragedy which results from isolation and anomie. When significant 
> numbers of us stop caring about our neighbors and only seek our own 
> personal benefit, we all lose, on average and typically individually 
> as well. The oligarch who lives high off the fat of the land might be 
> sacrificing his entire family, ultimately, for his momentary 
> pleasures. Landlords did not do well in China after the revolution. 
> There was great injustice to many, to be sure, but this took place 
> because the society did not take care to distribute wealth fairly.
>
> I'm *not* proposing communism, it's certainly not clear that it's fair 
> to *equally* distribute wealth, precisely because effort is not equal, 
> nor is the benefit to society of that effort on the part of 
> individuals. However, social organization should benefit all, it 
> should always be a positive return for individuals to participate 
> rather than rebel or subvert the system.
>
> And voluntary participation is always preferable to coerced 
> participation, when that is possible. Indeed, coercion should be 
> reserved for protection, where possible. I'm not settled, myself, on 
> the issues of matters like solving the tragedy of the commons by, say, 
> legal control, punishment, and taxes for maintenance. My sense is that 
> better solutions exist, but, until we have them, I'd also prefer to 
> leave the status quo. Destroying the protective mechanisms that have 
> been built up over centuries, before having alternatives in place, 
> proven to work, strikes me as foolish, an error that was made many 
> times in the last century, with disastrous consequences. Perhaps I'm 
> becoming a conservative in my old age, but not really. I'm just 
> recognizing the true instinct underlying conservatism, a fear of 
> premature change, a fear that has often been quite justified.
>
> Fortunately, we can reform the system without such premature, abrupt 
> change. And we can start today. Subscribe to fa-dp at yahoogroups.com ( 
> fa-dp-subscribe at yahoogroups.com )if you'd like to be part of the 
> solution, or at least to watch it unfold. This is about far more than 
> election methods, so I'll be shifting most of the discussion, for my 
> part, away from the EM list; this post is going there as well as EM 
> because there are FA/DP related issues that have come up. And there 
> are other initiatives under way, I'll be pointing to them on the fa-dp 
> list.
>
>