[Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there'reonly 2 factions

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 02:53 PM 8/31/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>Dear Adb ul-Rahman,
>
> > I dislike, by the way, describing voters as selfish if they vote in
> > their own interest. That's the default, they *should* vote in their
> > own interest.
>
>That is probably a language problem again. I thought "selfish" was a 
>synonym for "acting in my own interest only", is it not? However, 
>the latter was what I meant to say.

Yes, it is a synonym for that. However, the implication here is that 
not only is one acting in one's own self-interest, it is a narrow 
self interest that does not care if nearly half the electorate ends 
up with a maximally unsatisfactory outcome, as long as they 
personally gain a dime. This is actually sociopathy, someone who 
truly thinks like this and who is not afraid of consequences would 
slit your throat for pocket change.

In a Range poll, social utility is maximized if everyone votes 
*absolute* utilities, accurately. If we consider a Range poll a 
negotiation tool, then true self-interest suggests, if one were 
assured that most voters would, in fact, vote honestly (in a 
situation where absolute utilities are expected, strategic 
exaggeration is actually lying), that one vote, indeed, honestly and 
accurately, but there remains a problem.

The problem arises when a decision is going to be made immediately, 
from the Range poll results, without any opportunity to withhold 
consent. And so, a voter who is not sociopathically selfish may 
still, properly, vote to compensate for normalization effects in the 
votes of others. Theoretically, honest votes in the situation 
described would not be normalized, but how do voters know on what 
scale to describe their utilities? If that scale is not specified and 
commensurable, voters will understandably fear that what is truly a 
small preference on the part of others, will appear as a full-scale 
preference, and thus their own much greater absolute preference will 
be in danger of being swamped if they vote "sincerely." So they will 
vote either in full Approval style or with shifted utilities to 
reflect the risk they face.

What I am pointing out is that many writers have used the terms 
"selfish" and "sincere" and "strategic" without closely examining the 
underlying implications, and thus what is written can be misleading. 
As an obvious example, writers will write about "strategic voting" in 
Range and in ranked methods, with an easy implication that they are 
the same thing. However, in pure ranked methods there is no form of 
"strategic voting" which is the same as what exists in Range. 
Specifically, "strategic voting" in Range is equal ranking, 
typically, though moving a rating in a certain direction might also 
be called that, i.e., shifting a rating based on election 
probabilities. Strategic voting in ranked methods involves preference 
reversal, a drastic distortion, comparatively.

> > What I ended up suggesting was that the problem is resolved if the
> > voters negotiate. It's possible to set up transfers of value (money?)
> > such that the utilities are equalized, and that the benefit of
> > selecting C is thus distributed such that the A voters do *not* lose
> > by voting for C. If they vote for A, they get A but no compensation.
> > If they vote for C, they get C plus compensation. If the utilities
> > were accurate -- Juho claimed that they were *not* utilities, but
> > that then makes the problem incomprehensible in real terms -- then
> > overall satisfication is probably optimized by the choice of C with
> > compensation to the A voters, coming from the C voters. Certainly the
> > reverse is possible, that is, the A voters could pay the C voters
> > compensation to elect A, but it would have to be much higher compensation!
>
>I understood this. But I consider it quite absurd that the A voters 
>should be "compensated" for anything.

This is because you refuse to look at the underlying utilities. 
Because you don't believe in utility, in particular in 
*commensurable* utilities, you have only preference left, and from 
the raw preferences it appears that C is the best compromise.

Indeed, if that is all the information we have, C is the best compromise.

But what has been overlooked, which is precisely what makes the 
arguments about compensation mysterious to Jobst, is that compromise 
means that all parties lose something, compared to the ideal for them.

Suppose it is realized before the election that B is not a viable 
candidate, and we do not consider B at all. What we have left is

55: A>C
45: C>A

What is the optimal outcome? For ranked methods, it is obvious. For 
Range and selfish voters, it is also obvious. Only the introduction 
of the irrelevent candidate makes it appear not obvious.

But we do have more information than the ranks. *If* we assume 
commensurable utilities in the original votes, then we can say much 
more. There is a relative preference strength, commensurable, of 
100:80 for the A voters and 80:0 for the original B voters.

The majority has a weak preference and the minority a strong one. 
There is a complication, if this is a real election. The majority 
will have reduced motivation to turn out, so if we actually get a 
55:45 preference in the  final poll, the *real* preference would be 
greater than that, generally. Forcing all voters to turn out warps 
elections unnaturally, causing true weak preference to become equal 
to strong preference.

The common argument that strong preference is somehow selfish is 
seriously flawed, because true knowledge will cause strong 
preference. The *knowledgeable* may have a weak preference when they 
understand the complexity of a situation, but they will have have a 
strong preference when they see clearly. Forcing complete voter 
turnout *seems* like it will make results more "democratic," but, in 
fact, it amplifies the effect of media manipulation of voters, since 
this manipulation is more effective with those who care less, who are 
not motivated to research and reflect deeply.

In any case, consider the result shown above. Why should we choose C?

Well, what if there were a free negotiation between the A voters and 
the C voters. At an appropriate transfer of value (*no presumption 
exists that it is from C to A, it could be the reverse*), and if the 
two factions were uniform, the vote would be come unanimous, and, 
because the S.U. winner will optimize overall value to society, it is 
highly likely that the transfer would be from the C voters to the A voters.

But it could be in the other direction; however, that would make 
sense only if the commensurable utilities were different than stated. 
This is why I wrote about a transfer from the B voters to the A voters.

Consider the possibility that the B voters are rich and the A voters 
are poor. The A voters need that extra value more than the B voters. 
The transfer suggested by the commensurable utilities does not 
consider this, it simply equalizes the benefit from the result of 
choosing C, spreading it uniformly acrcoss society instead of 
selectively benefiting one faction.

The theory of this, that allows such unequal benefit, is justified by 
the assumption that over many elections, the value is spread. But 
that assumption is clearly accepting an unsatisfactory solution, 
perhaps because the negotiations are considered too complicated or 
difficult. It is *not* because they would be unjust, no, they would 
be *accurately* just.

This has become, from this discussion, crystal clear to me. "Tyranny 
of the majority" applies, really, to any decision made by less than 
consensus. A truly just system would equalize benefit from all 
decisions -- or, more accurately, it would link decisions such that 
benefit is equalized. The decision to build the public facility at C 
is a separate one from the decision that the residents of 
neighborhood B would be taxed more to compensate for the increased 
convenience to them, but a negotiation would link the two decisions 
-- and perhaps would substitute a voluntary offer in compromise, made 
in escrow, for a tax.

It makes sense for the C voters to offer to compensate the A voters 
for their relinquishment of their preference; and the most just 
compensation is one which equalizes benefit, such that all equally 
benefit from the result of the election.

The beautiful thing about the negotiation is that it equalizes 
utilities *without* having to use commensurable utilities in a Range 
election. The negotiation shifts utilities until all votes will vote, 
in their own self-interest, for the best compromise.

That C is even called the "compromise" candidate shows that Jobst 
recognizes that there is a loss. Is the loss shared equally? This 
could also be stated in term of differential gain, but, in fact, the 
term for this is "utility."

It is fashionable to state, "I don't believe in utilities," but if we 
look at what this could rationally mean, it must mean, not that there 
are no utilities, but that it is impossible to measure them in a way 
that makes them useful. Opponents of Range Voting are claiming that 
the distortions of strategy (including the necessary "strategy" or 
algorithm used to convert utilities to votes) make utilities useless.

But, in fact, that is an assertion that I have never seen proven. 
Rather, we can study election methods by positing utilities and 
seeing how they behave with various distributions of utilities among 
voters. Essentially, there is a Utility Measure that evaluates 
election methods based on how often they choose the S.U. maximizer, 
and, properly, when they do not, how great the loss of utility is. 
This is the work that Warren Smith has done.

It does *not* mean that utilities are actually used by the method. 
Rather, posited absolute utilities are used to create voting 
patterns, based on various strategies, and the method deals only with 
the voting patterns.

However, there can be circumstances with elections where the 
utilities become known. And free negotiations to compensate voters 
for voting a certain way, can discover absolute utilities. If there 
is no secret ballot, it becomes relatively simple, but various 
devices can be used when there is secret ballot, and vote buying -- 
which, as it has existed, is a form of corruption -- should become a nonissue.

(What is offensive about vote buying is when it is secret and used to 
shift an election result, with compensation only to a few voters; 
such buying does *not* equalize benefits, rather it distorts them 
even further. Suppose the B voters get together to make an offer to a 
selected subset of the A voters, just 6% of the electorate. This 
would cost them less than compensating all the A voters. Even if they 
paid these voters double the fair equalization, they would be ahead. 
A subset of the A voters, about 10%, gains all the benefit of the 
compensation, and the rest of them are uncompensated. In practical 
terms, however, it would be difficult to keep such an offer secret 
with such a large group, and so such a secret manipulation would only 
make sense if the gap between the A and B factions was smaller. There 
remain implications unexplored here.)

>  This would be only justified if something was taken from them 
> which in a sense belonged to them rightfully.

That is correct. And something is is taken which is legitimately 
theirs, which is an equal share of the benefits of social 
decision-making. other things being equal. We routinely accept 
inequality in this, but that does not mean that it is just to do so.

(Other things being equal means that, for example, all are paying the 
same taxes. Note that I gave a real-world example of equalization, it 
seems that all this has been wasted on Jobst. Equalization works and 
is recognized as just by those participating in it, including those 
who pay, effectively, to the others.)

>  What my arguing is all about is that I don't think the A voters 
> have such a right to the certain election of A, at most one could 
> perhaps say the have a right to A getting at least 55% winning probability.

Jobst gets here by assuming that it is a given that the A voters are 
going to participate in this society, that they are not going to 
walk, presumably because they will not be allowed to.

What he is doing is presuming fixed election outcomes, that cannot be 
modified to make them agreeable to all. He is assuming that consensus 
is impossible to obtain. The kind of negotiations I mentioned are 
free ones, and the negotiation is deliberative process. Election 
methods are dangerous because they bypass deliberative process, and 
this must be understood to understand the theory of elections. The 
problem of deliberation, the difficulty of it, appears when the scale 
is large, and because we have not developed the mechanisms which 
would make large-scale negotiations practical. But even if we accept 
that they are impractical -- and I believe that they *are* practical, 
and I believe I understand how it could be done, FA/DP -- this would 
not make them and their results unjust. His argument is that it would 
be unjust; what he wishes to do is to impose some system on this 
electorate that would *force* the A voters to accept the loss of 
their preference.

But if we look at a small group with similar underlying utilities, 
even two people with A>C and C>A preferences, and we insist upon 
consensus in order to make any decision at all -- which becomes much 
more necessary when there are two people! -- the matter becomes 
clear. Would we think that these people should make the choice by lottery?

Sure, if there is no better way. If they cannot, for some reason, 
negotiate with each other. If the utilities are not equal, one side 
or the other is going to, relatively speaking, lose. What is *normal* 
in social interaction, however is that some negotiation takes place. 
It may be a very informal one, based on something like "Well see your 
favorite movie this time and mine next time," or it may be quite 
formal, a contract that states, "You will do this and I will pay you 
that." It is *routine*. But Jobst, looking it through some very 
narrow slits, sees only the decision-making process, with restricted 
options, and no possibility of any compensation or negotiation that 
would make the result equally satisfactory to everyone.

This way of thinking is common, it is a major obstacle to true 
reform. There are probably hundreds of held concepts that interfere 
with clear thinking about our situation, and it takes time to dismantle them.

But we are doing it. I see great progress over the last few years, 
and it is accelerating. The necessary insights are becoming more common.

http://www.bobdylan.com/songs/times.html


>  So, if they would prefer to have A with 55% and B with 45% over 
> having C with 100%, only then one could perhaps argue that they 
> should be compensated if C was to be elected with certainty.

But that is exactly what is being proposed. The A voters are 
compensated in order to make the election of C certain. It's certain 
if they all agree!

The lottery analysis is one which tests normalized utilities, not 
absolute ones. That's its defect. It works if the range of the A 
voters and the B voters is equal, such that the preferences stated 
are commensurable.

I'm not sure I've seen a precise description of how the lottery would 
work, though, and perhaps I don't understand it. What I see, however, 
is that an election run in this way, with real utilities underneath, 
leaves part of the electorate with a different benefit than another 
part. Only one outcome can be chosen, we assume, so what we are 
trying to do is choose the one which does the least damage -- or 
produces the most *overall* benefit, without caring how this is 
distributed. This can fail rather badly if it creates even a small 
minority which is highly dissatisfied, they can start to sabotage the 
society. Even tiny minorities, highly motivated, can do a lot of 
damage! Think Shining Path.

Spreading out the benefits of social organization such that all 
benefit from it equally -- at least roughly -- actually should benefit all.

It is in our common interest to avoid the tragedy of the commons, a 
tragedy which results from isolation and anomie. When significant 
numbers of us stop caring about our neighbors and only seek our own 
personal benefit, we all lose, on average and typically individually 
as well. The oligarch who lives high off the fat of the land might be 
sacrificing his entire family, ultimately, for his momentary 
pleasures. Landlords did not do well in China after the revolution. 
There was great injustice to many, to be sure, but this took place 
because the society did not take care to distribute wealth fairly.

I'm *not* proposing communism, it's certainly not clear that it's 
fair to *equally* distribute wealth, precisely because effort is not 
equal, nor is the benefit to society of that effort on the part of 
individuals. However, social organization should benefit all, it 
should always be a positive return for individuals to participate 
rather than rebel or subvert the system.

And voluntary participation is always preferable to coerced 
participation, when that is possible. Indeed, coercion should be 
reserved for protection, where possible. I'm not settled, myself, on 
the issues of matters like solving the tragedy of the commons by, 
say, legal control, punishment, and taxes for maintenance. My sense 
is that better solutions exist, but, until we have them, I'd also 
prefer to leave the status quo. Destroying the protective mechanisms 
that have been built up over centuries, before having alternatives in 
place, proven to work, strikes me as foolish, an error that was made 
many times in the last century, with disastrous consequences. Perhaps 
I'm becoming a conservative in my old age, but not really. I'm just 
recognizing the true instinct underlying conservatism, a fear of 
premature change, a fear that has often been quite justified.

Fortunately, we can reform the system without such premature, abrupt 
change. And we can start today. Subscribe to fa-dp at yahoogroups.com ( 
fa-dp-subscribe at yahoogroups.com )if you'd like to be part of the 
solution, or at least to watch it unfold. This is about far more than 
election methods, so I'll be shifting most of the discussion, for my 
part, away from the EM list; this post is going there as well as EM 
because there are FA/DP related issues that have come up. And there 
are other initiatives under way, I'll be pointing to them on the fa-dp list.