[Election-Methods] RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?

[Diego Santos]

2007/11/30, Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>:
>
>
> I agree, they should. But how can you promise it?


I cannot do it. But pairwise sorted plurality, like DMC, gives more freedom
than winning votes, because wv advantage over margins is based in
truncation.

However, using the plurality vote as the strength of a defeat would cause
> clone independence to be violated. More importantly, it's likely that this
> measure would mean that you need to rank a viable candidate in the top
> position on your ballot, or risk causing him to lose.


I think that cloneproof violation is not severe when a method meets Smith.
Probably near all majority rule cycles in contetions elections will be
caused by burying. Then, additional resistance to this strategy will be
desirable for a Condorcet method. If clone independence is desirable too,
"Smith,IRV" is an alternative.

In my opinion it's better for it to be safer to be sincere about your first
> preference, than for it to be safe to rank less preferred candidates whose
> supporters you fear will use strategy against you.


I am not advocating pairwise sorted plurality as a definitive voting method,
it is only an initial thought. I have fear that some methods can encourage
people to bullet their vote.

________________________________
Diego Santos
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