[EM] HR811 and Federal paper trail legislation

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 09:39 AM 5/24/2007, Chris Backert wrote [privately to me]:
>With all due respect I think a better education on the topic would boggle
>your mind a bit less. You are incorrect that in your assumption that a
>"simple" paper ballot would satisfy the requirements, nor would it be a
>workable solution for most local jurisdictions.

Okay, I'm now slightly better educated, and find Mr. Backert's 
comment to be contrary to what I found.

A little knowledge is a dangerous thing, but unless Mr. Backert backs 
up his assertion with some detail, I find it necessary to disregard it.

From: http://www.fec.gov/hava/hava.htm which includes the text of the HAVA.

>SEC. 301. <<NOTE: 42 USC 15481.>> VOTING SYSTEMS STANDARDS.
>
>     (a) Requirements.--Each voting system used in an election for
>Federal office shall meet the following requirements:
[requirements deleted, see the text of the law]

>             (2) Protection of paper ballot voting systems.--For purposes
>         of subsection (a)(1)(A)(i), the term ``verify'' may not be
>         defined in a manner that makes it impossible for a paper ballot
>         voting system to meet the requirements of such subsection or to
>         be modified to meet such requirements.

Generally, it seems that paper ballot systems, together with 
procedures for how the voting process is handled, can easily satisfy 
HAVA. On the question of detecting overvotes, a matter which was of 
some concern to those of us who advocate approval voting, where there 
are no overvotes, while the law defines an overvote in a way which 
apparently did not consider that one might vote for more than one 
candidate as a normal and proper thing, I find:

>[the system shall:]
>     (iii) if the voter selects votes for more than
>                       one candidate for a single office--
>                                     (I) notify the voter that the voter
>                                 has selected more than one candidate for
>                                 a single office on the ballot;
>                                     (II) notify the voter before the
>                                 ballot is cast and counted of the effect
>                                 of casting multiple votes for the
>                                 office; and
>                                     (III) provide the voter with the
>                                 opportunity to correct the ballot before
>                                 the ballot is cast and counted.
>                     (B) A State or jurisdiction that uses a paper ballot
>                 voting system, a punch card voting system, or a central
>                 count voting system (including mail-in absentee ballots
>                 and mail-in ballots), may meet the requirements of
>                 subparagraph (A)(iii) by--
>                           (i) establishing a voter education program
>                       specific to that voting system that notifies each
>                       voter of the effect of casting multiple votes for
>                       an office; and
>                           (ii) providing the voter with instructions on
>                       how to correct the ballot before it is cast and
>                       counted (including instructions on how to correct
>                       the error through the issuance of a replacement
>                       ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change
>                       the ballot or correct any error).
>                     (C) The voting system shall ensure that any
>                 notification required under this paragraph preserves the
>                 privacy of the voter and the confidentiality of the
>                 ballot.

Note, further, that even though paper ballot systems are exempt from 
the overvote notification requirement, provided the voter is clearly 
informed regarding the consequence of casting multiple votes -- which 
is that the votes are counted under an Approval voting system -- it 
is quite feasible and, indeed, inexpensive to provide a scanner and 
computer for voters that would scan a paper ballot for obvious 
errors, including undervotes and overvotes, if any, and report these 
to the voter in a manner that satisfies HAVA completely.

The particular problem with HAVA and Approval Voting was raised by 
Rob Richie of FairVote, who might be described as a hard-core IRV 
advocate (he makes his living at it), and he certainly did not 
mention that paper ballots were totally exempt from the requirement. 
Want cheap? Paper ballots. Even if he or she thinks that the 
jurisdiction might eventually want a more sophisticated system, an 
elections official could quite reasonably wait until the smoke 
clears, and use paper ballots ad interim. But I think paper ballots, 
*with good procedures*, are a good system for the foreseeable future, 
short of secure internet voting, which brings a host of problems of 
its own, not the least of which is that the verifiability of the 
process *by the public* becomes practically impossible. Who watches 
admin? Systems that allow internet voters to submit votes but which 
create a paper trail that becomes the actual voting record is what 
I'd suggest for internet voting; it would essentially be an absentee 
ballot as now, a two-part process that creates the ballot and a cover 
envelope identifying the voter. The collection of empty cover 
envelopes identifies the voters as having voted, but it becomes 
disconnected from the actual ballot. And the process by which such 
votes are received would require tight control, it is not simple to 
make it fully verifiable. But the same problem already exists with 
absentee ballots.

By the way, I'll note that Florida 2000 was manipulated in multiple 
ways (at least there are credible assertions regarding this, my 
purpose here is not to accuse anyone but to discuss what is 
possible), and that one which some critics have asserted should have 
been pursued by the Gore campaign was manipulation of the absentee 
vote by dropping clear standards for accepting absentee votes, 
allowing what were probably -- it is asserted -- many illegal votes, 
submitted *after* the election, to be counted. At least this is what 
I recall. Those votes were enough to turn the election, though, of 
course, the phase of the moon was enough to turn that particular election.