[EM] danger of coercion (Re: First U.S. Scientific Election Audit...)

[Juho]

On May 18, 2007, at 6:45 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

> At 06:32 AM 5/17/2007, Juho wrote:
>> >> What would be the most likely scenario where the coerced person  
>> could
>> >> not avoid being coerced? I'm assuming that a typical coercer would
>> >> not be a member in the team that counts the votes and he/she would
>> >> not have open access to the ballots.
>> >
>> > That's not reliable.
>>
>> I asked for the most likely scenario. I'll take this to mean that
>> maybe the most likely scenario is one where the coercer sits in the
>> vote counting team.
>
> The victim does not necessarily know where the coercer, or someone  
> allied with the coercer, sits. I don't think, in addition, that we  
> can make any general statement about how likely it is that the  
> coercer has inside access. We can, indeed, conclude that access to  
> what is visibly expressed on ballots will broader the actual access  
> of one who would coerce votes, but it also will make coercion  
> schemes more visible and more likely to be discovered. I don't  
> think we can predict whether ballot imaging will, overall, make  
> coercion more or less likely. My intuition is less, but I can  
> easily understand that someone would think that it would be more.
>
> However, the level of cooperation with coercion is very unlikely to  
> be large; if it looks like it is headed that way, procedures can be  
> revised. *Massive* coercion is actually easier to detect and  
> defeat, what would be very hard would be the isolated coercion of  
> one individual over another, such as a spouse coercing a spouse. I  
> think this, however, would remain extremely rare. And vote coercion  
> should be treated as a serious crime. It is a dangerous business  
> for the coercer, actually, much more than for the coerced. If my  
> vote is coerced, the cost for me to comply is small. It is really  
> only when large numbers of votes are coerced, in some pattern, that  
> a different level of cost emerges. One vote is only one vote, it is  
> vanishingly rare that it affects an election outcome. As I  
> mentioned, if evidence emerges, as it must with public imaging,  
> that there is more than minimal coercion, steps can be taken to  
> interdict it. Those steps have a cost. One of the obvious steps is  
> to shut down the imaging program. I consider that a high cost,  
> frankly. There would have to be more than a rare instance of  
> coercion to make the disease less costly than that particular remedy.
>
>> An alternative method is to require potential additional candidates
>> to collect a list of e.g. 1000 supporters before the election and
>> thereby become "regular candidates".
>
> My own suggestion has been merely to require registration. The  
> proposal Juho makes misses the point of write-in candidacies. They  
> are for candidates who were unable to get on the ballot. Ballots  
> are printed in large numbers, with fairly onerous security, and  
> they must be widely distributed. They cannot be printed the day  
> before the election, it would practically guarantee that some  
> polling places would not get their ballots. Presses can break down,  
> printing can be delayed. You don't want to push it. There are  
> absentee voters as well, who need ballots in advance of election day.

Maybe it would be ok to require all the candidates to wake up already  
let's say two (?) months before the election.

Another approach would be to use ballots that do not list the names  
of the candidates but just contain space where the number of the  
candidate can be written (that's what I'm used to - adds some risk of  
handwriting recognition when compared e.g. to just ticking boxes, but  
I can use my left (weaker) hand if needed). Very much like what you  
propose below.

>
> Registration would result in the candidate receiving a registration  
> number, which could be indicated on the ballot, where needed, using  
> standard marks, avoiding the written name, which would be far more  
> reliable for identification.
>
> But my real point is that we don't need cumbersome restrictions to  
> solve a problem that is practically nonexistent. We are trying to  
> avoid coerced voting where the coercer requires the voter to make  
> the ballot identifiable. Quite simply, I expect this to be  
> vanishingly rare. When you get millions of people voting, "rare"  
> may be almost guaranteed to happen sometimes. But that does not  
> mean that we stand everything on its head to prevent a rare  
> occurrence. Rather, we consider the cost of that occurrence and  
> balance it with the cost of attempting to totally prevent it.
>
> My advice to someone who is a victim of attempted vote coercion  
> requiring validation? If you fear that your vote will actually be  
> observed, that if you do not mark your ballot as required so that  
> it satisfies the coercer, you will be subject to serious harm, vote  
> as required. And if you can find any authority you trust, report  
> that you are doing so. Your vote is visible, by the conditions of  
> this problem. You can prove that you voted in this way. And you  
> could, for example, wear a wire when you go back to your dear  
> tyrant husband and tell him that "I voted as you wished, dear, but  
> I'm worried that the mark I made will rub off." If he answers "You  
> better hope it doesn't," then, well, you can be relieved of his  
> presence if that is what you want.... otherwise ....
>
> Of course, if you have enough time, you could have a similar  
> conversation before the actual election....
>
> But if you think all this too risky, and it's your call, just vote  
> as directed. The cost to society is only one vote, and your life  
> and security are far more important than that.
>
>> I propose simple ballots and separate ballots for each race in
>> addition to what you said.
>
> Not a snowball's chance in h e double toothpicks, as my wife's  
> father used to say.
>
> The public expense is relatively large. What is the evidence that  
> the cost of not doing this is greater?

Simple ballots would be cheap to print.

>
>
>> >> Of course cameras and video equipment should be banned in the  
>> voting
>> >> location. It is not possible to guarantee 100% that such recording
>> >> will not take place but one should try.
>> >
>> > I disagree. And nobody searched me for my cell phone when I last
>> > voted.
>>
>> No need to remove cell phones, just to make it clear to all that
>> taking pictures is forbidden (maybe even punishable if extreme
>> measures are needed).
>
> Oh, dear. But vote coercion is already a serious crime. Why would  
> such a rule make any difference at all?

Keeping the system healthy is easier and cheaper that healing it  
after it has become seriously ill. Light rules may be enough.

>
>
>> >> Combining multiple elections in one ballot is a risk.
>> >
>> > Sure. But it is absolutely the norm. In fact, I've never voted in a
>> > public election where there were not many races on the single  
>> ballot.
>>
>> Bad design. I have never voted in an election with several races on
>> one sheet. (Usually there has been only one race per election, but
>> when there have been more the ballots have been separate.)
>
> Really? Where do you live? What elections have you participated in?

Finland. Mostly local, national and EU level PR elections and  
national single winner elections.

>
>
>> >> The risk of allowing access to the ballots to everyone is much
>> >> riskier than having multiple vote counters (maybe not local  
>> people)
>> >> each counting a small portion of the votes.
>> >
>> > You say so. What is the evidence?
>>
>> No evidence, just the understanding that allowing the ballots to be
>> inspected by whoever has interest, with sufficient time to do careful
>> analysis and with whatever techniques may reveal something of the
>> identity of the voters of the ballots.
>
> If the voters do not choose to make that information explicitly  
> visible, it would be extremely impossible simply from looking at  
> the images. If you can gain access to the ballots themselves, it is  
> more possible.
>
>
>> > There is a lost performative in the last comment from Juho. "In
>> > having multiple vote counters"....
>> >
>> > *Who* is going to "have" multiple vote counters?
>>
>> The society. Sorry for my non-native English.
>
> "The society" has the same problem. To say "the society" avoids  
> specifying who actually counts the ballots. It avoids facing the  
> issue of how counters are chosen, and how that process can be  
> manipulated. If you *really* want the society to count the ballots,  
> you might warm to my idea! That is exactly what I'm proposing:
>
>> > The fact is that this is what I'm suggesting: multiple vote  
>> counters!
>> >
>> > Ballot imaging would put the public in the position of being an
>> > election observer, to a degree.
>>
>> The step of initial vote counting (and possibly imaging) may be even
>> more critical point to safeguard.
>
> What I'm suggesting is this: votes are typically deposited in a  
> ballot box. In the small town where I recently lived, the ballot  
> box was a machine that is probably over a hundred years old. It has  
> a slot on the top and a crank that you turn when you insert a  
> ballot in the top. The machine is designed such that you can insert  
> a ballot into it, but you cannot retrieve a ballot from it, without  
> removing the locks on a door. It is not always that elaborate, but  
> the point is that ballots are deposited into a secure box that is  
> guarded. In fact, these things, the boxes, get lost, or are  
> deliberately discarded in some places, but that is another  
> story.... It would be pretty hard to lose the box in Cummington, it  
> was pretty bulky....
>
> Anyway, at a certain point the box is opened and the ballots are  
> removed. I'm suggesting that this would take place with multiple  
> observers, and that the ballots would be immediately numbered,  
> imaged, and sequestered. When they are being imaged, they would be  
> available, under continuous observation, for imaging by observers.  
> Certainly an observer from each party, but also media observers.  
> This all happens together, in a place where everyone sees what  
> everyone else is doing. The handling of the ballots would be  
> closely controlled, but the best control is redundant observation  
> of every step.

(It would be enough for me to just count the votes (in the presence  
of the multiple observers (from all parties etc)) and then pack and  
seal the votes in a box (in case there will be later doubts about the  
process).)

>
> The counting is then done with images, not with the original  
> ballots. The counting is *easier* than now, because the security  
> required is much less. The images are expendable and replaceable.  
> The counting is done with a copy of the images, it is not as if  
> there is only one image and they handle it. That's the official  
> count. It can, with images, be done more rapidly than with actual  
> ballots. But parallel to this, media and other interested  
> individuals would also be counting the ballots, using images made  
> available on the internet. I'd personally find it interesting to  
> count a few.
>
> That's what the serialization is about. When I count a ballot, I  
> would enter the information on a form. If we assume that the serial  
> number is easily machine readable, that number could be  
> automatically filled in on the form; and so all I would need to do  
> is check off "votes" on a form that resembles the ballots,  
> converting the image to vote data. At the same time, I'd assume  
> that automated recognition would be doing the same thing. Anyone  
> could run the automated recognition software, so I'm not sure how  
> much actual hand counting would take place. Public databases would  
> be built up with all this information. There will be count  
> conflicts, and these will be flagged, and then people will pay  
> special attention to those ballots. Truly ambiguous ballots will be  
> identified.
>
> So a final report, which would represent a general consensus, would  
> segregate ambiguous or controversial ballots from those where there  
> is no controversy. None of this public process affects the official  
> outcome, which is announced from the official counting process.  
> Rather, the public process is a watchdog, it barks if there is  
> something wrong with the official count (which likewise reports  
> exact ballot information as entered, including the serial numbers).  
> The public count does not interfere with the official count.
>
> If however, the public count shows discrepancies with the official  
> count, there are then immediate and clear grounds for a recount  
> request, and clear evidence to present, not speculation. And if the  
> recount leaves the discrepancies unresolved, then there would be  
> court action, and it might be necessary to examine the sequestered  
> ballots. I'd expect this to be extremely rare.
>
>> > By the way, ever try to get correlated election data? Did people
>> > who voted for Bush vote against the school bonds? That kind of data
>> > has plenty of legitimate use. And you can't get it now, unless you
>> > are willing to spend prohibitive amounts of money to get it....
>>
>> Sounds a bit dangerous from privacy point of view. The next step
>> could be to include the voter's profession, age etc. Better be
>> careful with these.
>
> Juho, nothing was suggested about collecting private information.

Ok, my words exaggerated a bit, but the point is that risk of losing  
privacy grows when larger amounts of person related data is linked  
together.

Juho

> What was suggested was that the information on ballots, which has  
> become *public* information, in fact, be made available. It's  
> already public information, you should understand that. You can get  
> access to it if you want. But it is inordinately expensive. I'm not  
> sure how much the media spent recounting in Florida after the 2000  
> election, but it was a fortune. It was a consortium that did it.
>
> If ballot imaging had been in place, and the ballots had been  
> simple paper ballots, the whole thing would have been over in a few  
> days. For the public to count the entire election with massive  
> redundancy should not take more than a day....
>
> One of the big errors made in Florida was to require that a  
> *decision* be made on each ballot. Because of the nature of those  
> voting machines, there were lots of ambiguous ballots, with the  
> famous hanging chad. Instead of deciding on each ballot, the court,  
> in my opinion, should have ordered and instituted a classification  
> system. A set of observers would follow established standards for  
> identifying ballot characteristics. This was done to some degree,  
> but instead of requiring a decision on the vote result right then,  
> I would have had, instead, the *votes* of the observers recorded as  
> to the characteristics. The court would have then sorted it out by  
> determining the exact standards to apply: for example, a two or  
> three corner attached chad might be considered unpunched, and a one- 
> corner as having been punched. Specific overvotes would have been  
> reported instead of merely discounting the ballots and recording  
> them as spoiled. Etc., etc.
>
> It's really what any scientific investigation would do....
>


		
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