[EM] Does this method already have a name?

[Chris Benham]

Forest W Simmons wrote:

>Ballots are ordinal with approval cutoffs.
>
Forest,
I gather from your description of the method that the voters don't/can't 
give explicit
approval cutoffs that allow them to rank among unapproved candidates. I 
say this because
in the algorithm these cuttoffs are "moved" about with their 'original 
position' having no effect.
Is that right?

If so, it seems to me that they way you define the ballots somewhat 
mixes up the concepts of
input and algorithm and maybe even strategy.

>The candidate with "Maximum Minimal Reactionary Approval" wins.
>
>A candidate's "reactionary approval" relative to another candidate is 
>the approval she would get if the approval cutoff were moved adjacent 
>to (but not past) the other candidate's position in the ballot order on 
>every ballot.
>  
>

Am I correct in taking it that (a) sometimes the "approval cutoff" is 
moved so that some ballots
'approve' none of the candidates, and (b) the cutoff is never moved to a 
position where it distinguishes
between candidates given the same rank?


Chris  Benham



Forest W Simmons wrote:

>Ballots are ordinal with approval cutoffs.
>
>The candidate with "Maximum Minimal Reactionary Approval" wins.
>
>A candidate's "reactionary approval" relative to another candidate is 
>the approval she would get if the approval cutoff were moved adjacent 
>to (but not past) the other candidate's position in the ballot order on 
>every ballot.
>
>So each candidate's score is her minimum reactionary approval relative 
>to the other candidates.  The candidate with the highest score wins.
>
>It turns out that when rankings are complete this method is equivalent 
>to the common versions of MinMax.
>
>It doesn't get tripped up on Kevin's standard example against pure MMPO:
>
>49 A
>1 A=B
>1 B=C
>49 C
>
>Does it satisfy the FBC?
>
>Forest
>----
>election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>  
>