[EM] Trees and single-winner methods
chrisjbenham at optusnet.com.au
Thu Mar 15 09:20:16 PDT 2007
>On Mar 14, 2007, at 19:23 , Chris Benham wrote:
>>>Here's one more election method for you to consider....
>>>Let's start from a Condorcet method (it doesn't matter much which
>>>one). Then we allow the candidates to form groups. Each group will
>>>be handled as if it was a single candidate.
>>I reject this on the same grounds that I reject the "candidate
>>withdrawal option" (in say IRV) and
>>"Asset Voting": I am only interested in single-winner methods
>>where the result is purely determined
>>(as far as possible) by voters voting, and not by the machinations
>That sounds quite strict. The voters still have all the power
>although the algorithm threats different candidates slightly
>different (depending on what the candidate tree looks like). A
>majority of the voters can pick any candidate they want.
>Note that it is very typical in elections that the parties will
>decide on what candidates will be offered to the voters to choose
>from in any case. So the parties will have some impact in most
>elections anyway. They may arrange preliminaries, decide if they
>nominate more than one candidate etc.
Yes of course, but I don't regard the nomination process as part of the
>How about multi-winner elections - do you say that open and closed
>list elections are no good and only flat candidate structures like in
>STV, are ok?
I regard STV as vastly preferable, but list systems can be partly
excused because they achieve
approximate party-proportionality with much greater simplicity and maybe
can regard a whole list as a "candidate" with the special feature that
it can be fractionally elected.
>I see candidate withdrawal related problems to be quite different
>from what I see in the proposed three based method. The biggest
>problem I see in candidate withdrawal is that if the person/group
>that makes the decision on withdrawal already knows the given votes,
>then it is possible to decide the winner in a small group, partially
>bypassing the opinions that the voters expressed in the ballots. This
>also opens the door to horse trading or even blackmailing. The
>proposed method at least is based on giving full information to the
>voters already before the election and letting the voters decide.
Yes, I agree that your idea (with everything up front before the vote)
is much better (less bad)
>Maybe you have some examples where the proposed method would behave
>in some unacceptable way. That would help evaluating what the method
>is good for.
I have none to hand, but like I said, it doesn't interest me.
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