[EM] A way that DAMC might fail FBC (I'm not sure that it does)
mikeo2106 at msn.com
Tue Mar 13 17:06:31 PDT 2007
One way that DAMC _won't_ fails FBC: If a majority rank Favorite over
Compromise, then, by voting Compromise over Favorite, you can't change the
fact that a majority have ranked Favorite over Compromise, and so you can't
get rid of that majority defeat of Compromise. That made it seem to me that
DAMC probably meets FBC.
But what if Compromise loses because is has a majority defeat with not much
approval strength, so it's kept fairly late in the keeping process.
And what if, when you make Favorite have a majority defeat by some
particular other candidate, a defeat with fairly strong approval strength,
you can make it so that your new defeat completes a cycle such that keeping
Comromise's defeat would make a cycle among kept defeats. Preventing
Compromise's defeat from being kept lets Compromise be unbeaten, without
which a worse candidate would win.
Yes, that's just a sketch. An example would be needed to actually
demonstrate an FBC failure. Can anyone say why such a scenario wouldn't
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