[EM] A way that DAMC might fail FBC (I'm not sure that it does)

Michael Ossipoff mikeo2106 at msn.com
Tue Mar 13 17:06:31 PDT 2007

One way that DAMC _won't_ fails FBC: If a majority rank Favorite over 
Compromise, then, by voting Compromise over Favorite, you can't change the 
fact that a majority have ranked Favorite over Compromise, and so you can't 
get rid of that majority defeat of Compromise. That made it seem to me that 
DAMC probably meets FBC.

But what if Compromise loses because is has a majority defeat with not much 
approval strength, so it's kept fairly late in the keeping process.

And what if, when you make Favorite have a majority defeat by some 
particular other candidate, a defeat with fairly strong approval strength, 
you can make it so that your new defeat completes a cycle such that keeping 
Comromise's defeat would make a cycle among kept defeats. Preventing 
Compromise's defeat from being kept lets Compromise be unbeaten, without 
which a worse candidate would win.

Yes, that's just a sketch. An example would be needed to actually 
demonstrate an FBC failure. Can anyone say why such a scenario wouldn't 

Mike Ossipoff

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