[EM] What is the idal method for sincere voters?
mikeo2106 at msn.com
Sat Mar 3 13:34:09 PST 2007
Okay, that rarity of rarities, an original post by me. A great deal of
criticism of voting methods is based on how the methods behave with
"strategic voters," those who vote insincerely to gain some presumably
Mr. Lomax is missing the point. It isnt so much how the method behaves with
strategic voters. Its more a matter of which methods require strategy from
a majority who want to get their way or keep someone worse than the CW from
winning. With nearly every method a majority can get its way
somehow. Its a
question of what they have to do. Some methods are relatively free from
strategy, and some, such as CR, have strategy very much a part of their
voting. An inextricable, integral part of their voting. Im not saying
thats real bad. I like two CR versions: Approval and -1,0,1. But I dont
try to deny that theres a lot of strategy involved in voting those methods.
You dont want CR unless you like strategy. Some of us like Approval
strategy as a game. Condorcet is too easy to vote. <smiley>
Too easy, but maybe not too easy for everyone. The more strategy free
methods such as SSD, MDDA & MAMPO definitely have their place, if one
believes, as I do, that most voters sharing ones basic political beliefs
have poor judgement about what is approvable.
What an offensively strategic voter can do to cause a strategy need or
strategy dilemma for someone else is a secondary issue.
By the way, maybe you wonder why I keep replying to what Lomax says. I dont
mean this in a critical way, but, even if you ordinarily wouldnt reply,
sometimes the sheer incredible arrogance can make you say, I should say
something. Im not mean. Im not aggressive. But cant enough be enough
that theres point when its ok to say something??
A little background is in order. Objection! the defense says. I reply,
Your honor, Im establishing a consistent pattern.
You know, it isnt easy to get kicked off a mailing list. But Mr. Lomax, got
himself kicked off the Approval mailing list. I dont know the details. But
I can guess, based on my own observations of Lomax on the RangeVoting list.
Lomax came along, obviously perceiving himself as the messiah of governance.
Just from EM, you know what Im talking about. Dont deny it.
He insisted that we needed Roberts Rules of Order. No one agreed with him.
No one wanted to govern the RangeVotng list or organization by Lomaxs
theories of governance. But, there too, Lomaxs arrogance was nothing short
of astounding and monumental.
After the experience with Lomax on the RangeVoting list, it began to be not
so incomprehensible how Lomax could have gotten himself kicked off the
Did he keep unwelcomly trying to teach them governance too? Or refuse to
stop telling them what their topic guidelines should be?
In keeping with his previous pattern, Lomax says his characteristically
arrogant things here too, and yes Im replying. Does it really make sense to
do so? Not really.
Anyway, now that Ive explained, but certainly not justified, my replying to
this message, let me continue:
. However, if we assume sincere voters, what is the ideal election method,
or the best among the options we know? This list is about election methods,
but it is often assumed that these elections are taking place in
environments where some people will be highly motivated to be deceptive, if
they think this will benefit them
Actually, all the Condorcetists say that offensive order-reversal will be
rare enough to not be a problem, with wv Condorcet. Thats why the benefits
of SFC will plausibly be available.
But defensive strategy is rampant in our current elections. Where theres a
strategy need, theres a strategy use.
, and some methods, more than others, "encourage" this.
Well, the problem is more that some methods force it.
But not all election environments are like that.
Further, if we have an understanding of what is ideal with sincere voters,
then we have some means of approaching the problem with insincere voters,
because, presumably, we may want the same outcome
Well then Lomax would like Approval, where theres little difference between
a strategic ballot and a sincere ballot. With more preference levels,
thats less so.
and, in simulations, at least, we can see if the outcomes match and thus
have an understanding of what methods are vulnerable to strategic voting.
Thats been done. When theres a CW, and everyone votes sincerely, the CW
wins, with methods complying with the Condorcet Criterion.
THE CAPS LOCK HAS COME ON AND WONT GO OFF.
A few of us have stated that Range Voting is, of course, the ideal method
But of course! <smiley>
, but it is impractical because it is allegedly vulnerable to strategic
voting. I've challenged that conclusion, which is typically based on
considering bullet or Approval-style voting to be "strategic," where, in
fact, it is merely the expression of strong preference, and, I argue, one
will only vote Approval style in Range if there is a strong preference, in
which case it's not insincere!
You know, sometimes a newcomer arrives, and tells us how it is, on a matter
that was actually very well discussed here and elsewhere before his arrival.
This is a rather extreme example.
Its widely known that, with Cardinal Ratings (CR), a voter who wants to
maximize his/her expectation, regardless of whether his/her preferences are
very strong, will assign only the extreme ratings.
And, please, explain to me why a method that will work well for selecting
pizzas, with sincere votes, will not work well selecting political officers
I dont know whom Lomax buys pizza with, but most of us dont hear a whole
lot about a serious lesser-of-2-evils problem regarding pizzas. Partly
because pizza toppings dont affect our lives in so many ways. Partly
because you can have someone elses favorite toping today, and your favorite
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