[EM] What is the idal method for sincere voters?

[Michael Ossipoff]

Lomax says:

Okay, that rarity of rarities, an original post by me. A great deal of 
criticism of voting methods is based on how the methods behave with 
"strategic voters," those who vote insincerely to gain some presumably 
favorable outcome

I reply:

Mr. Lomax is missing the point. It isn‘t so much how the method behaves with 
strategic voters. It‘s more a matter of which methods require strategy from 
a majority who want to get their way or keep someone worse than the CW from 
winning. With nearly every method a majority can get its way…somehow. It’s a 
question of what they have to do. Some methods are relatively free from 
strategy, and some, such as CR, have strategy very much a part of their 
voting. An inextricable, integral part of their voting. I’m not saying 
that’s real bad. I like two CR versions: Approval and -1,0,1. But I don’t 
try to deny that there’s a lot of strategy involved in voting those methods. 
You don’t want CR unless you like strategy. Some of us like Approval 
strategy as a game. Condorcet is too easy to vote. <smiley>

Too easy, but maybe not too easy for everyone. The more strategy free 
methods such as SSD, MDDA & MAMPO definitely have their place, if one 
believes, as I do, that most voters sharing one’s basic political beliefs 
have poor judgement about what is approvable.

What an offensively strategic voter can do to cause a strategy need or 
strategy dilemma for someone else is a secondary issue.

By the way, maybe you wonder why I keep replying to what Lomax says. I don’t 
mean this in a critical way, but, even if you ordinarily wouldn’t reply, 
sometimes the sheer incredible arrogance can make you say, “I should say 
something.” I’m not mean. I’m not aggressive. But can’t enough be enough…so 
that there’s point when it’s ok to say something??

A little background is in order. “Objection!’ the defense says. I reply, 
“Your honor, I’m establishing a consistent pattern.”

You know, it isn’t easy to get kicked off a mailing list. But Mr. Lomax, got 
himself kicked off the Approval mailing list. I don’t know the details. But 
I can guess, based on my own observations of Lomax on the RangeVoting list. 
Lomax came along, obviously perceiving himself as the messiah of governance. 
Just from EM, you know what I’m talking about. Don’t deny it.

He insisted that we needed Robert’s Rules of Order. No one agreed with him. 
No one wanted to govern the RangeVotng list or organization by Lomax’s 
theories of governance. But, there too, Lomax’s arrogance was nothing short 
of astounding and monumental.

After the experience with Lomax on the RangeVoting list, it began to be not 
so incomprehensible how Lomax could have gotten himself kicked off the 
Approval list.
Did he keep unwelcomly trying to teach them governance too? Or refuse to 
stop telling them what their topic guidelines should be?

In keeping with his previous pattern, Lomax says his characteristically 
arrogant things here too, and yes I’m replying. Does it really make sense to 
do so? Not really.

Anyway, now that I’ve explained, but certainly not justified, my replying to 
this message, let me continue:

Lomax continues:

. However, if we assume sincere voters, what is the ideal election method, 
or the best among the options we know? This list is about election methods, 
but it is often assumed that these elections are taking place in 
environments where some people will be highly motivated to be deceptive, if 
they think this will benefit them

I reply:

Actually, all the Condorcetists say that offensive order-reversal will be 
rare enough to not be a problem, with wv Condorcet. That’s why the benefits 
of SFC will plausibly be available.

But defensive strategy is rampant in our current elections. Where there’s a 
strategy need, there’s a strategy use.

Lomax continues:

, and some methods, more than others, "encourage" this.

I reply:

Well, the problem is more that some methods force it.

Lomax continues:

But not all election environments are like that.

I reply:

Utopia.

Lomax continues:

Further, if we have an understanding of what is ideal with sincere voters, 
then we have some means of approaching the problem with insincere voters, 
because, presumably, we may want the same outcome

I reply:

Well then Lomax would like Approval, where there’s little difference between 
a strategic ballot and  a sincere ballot. With more preference levels, 
that’s less so.

Lomax continues:

and, in simulations, at least, we can see if the outcomes match and thus 
have an understanding of what methods are vulnerable to strategic voting.

I reply:

That’s been done. When there’s a CW, and everyone votes sincerely, the CW 
wins, with methods complying with the Condorcet Criterion.

THE CAPS LOCK HAS COME ON AND WON’T GO OFF.

Lomax continues:

A few of us have stated that Range Voting is, of course, the ideal method

I reply:

But of course!  <smiley>

Lomax continues:

, but it is impractical because it is allegedly vulnerable to strategic 
voting. I've challenged that conclusion, which is typically based on 
considering bullet or Approval-style voting to be "strategic," where, in 
fact, it is merely the expression of strong preference, and, I argue, one 
will only vote Approval style in Range if there is a strong preference, in 
which case it's not insincere!

I reply:

You know, sometimes a newcomer arrives, and tells us how it is, on a matter 
that was actually very well discussed here and elsewhere before his arrival. 
This is a rather extreme example.

It’s widely known that, with Cardinal Ratings (CR), a voter who wants to 
maximize his/her expectation, regardless of whether his/her preferences are 
very strong, will assign only the extreme ratings.

Lomax continues:

And, please, explain to me why a method that will work well for selecting 
pizzas, with sincere votes, will not work well selecting political officers

I reply:

I don’t know whom Lomax buys pizza with, but most of us don’t hear a whole 
lot about a serious lesser-of-2-evils problem regarding pizzas. Partly 
because pizza toppings don’t affect our lives in so many ways. Partly 
because you can have someone else’s favorite toping today, and your favorite 
topping tomorrow.

Mike Ossipoff