[EM] RE : Is "sincere" voting in Range suboptimal?

[Chris Benham]

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

>At 09:48 AM 7/23/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>  
>
>>Are you going to argue that it should make no difference to the voter
>>how likely it is that he will be able to change the outcome given some
>>way of voting?
>>    
>>
>
>No, for if it is so unlikely as to be impossible, rational voting 
>strategy is to not bother to vote.
>  
>
<snip>

>What I am arguing is that a voter should properly assume that many 
>other people will vote as he votes. If the voter knows that 
>assumption is true, then there is always a reasonable chance that the 
>voter's vote will shift the outcome, to the point where, if the voter 
>and those like him are in the majority, the voter's vote, depending 
>on the method, may be *certain* to affect the outcome.
>

I find these two statements (before and after the cut) a bit contradictory.

>The case I'm studying is zero-knowledge, Range 2, i.e., CR3. Three 
>candidates, voter's preference is A>B>C, with midrange sincere rating for B.
>
>We now know that in the two-voter case, the optimal vote is sincere.
>

No we don't. The "optimal vote" in your scenario is to max-rate A and 
min-rate B and C.
Comparing the two, the "truncated vote" beats the "sincere vote" in 3 
opposing ballot situations.

(1)B2 A0 C0: the truncated vote gives an AB tie while the sincere vote 
elects B

(2) B2 A1 C0: the truncated vote elects A while the sincere vote gives 
an AB tie.

(3) B2 C1 A0: the truncated vote gives an AB tie while the sincere vote 
elects B.

In all other cases the two give the same "voter satisfaction" score (by 
giving the same result in all
except one:)

B2 C2 A0: the truncated vote gives an ABC tie while the sincere vote 
elects B.

Chris Benham



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