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Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">At 09:48 AM 7/23/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Are you going to argue that it should make no difference to the voter
how likely it is that he will be able to change the outcome given some
way of voting?
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
No, for if it is so unlikely as to be impossible, rational voting
strategy is to not bother to vote.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<snip><br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">What I am arguing is that a voter should properly assume that many
other people will vote as he votes. If the voter knows that
assumption is true, then there is always a reasonable chance that the
voter's vote will shift the outcome, to the point where, if the voter
and those like him are in the majority, the voter's vote, depending
on the method, may be *certain* to affect the outcome.</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
I find these two statements (before and after the cut) a bit
contradictory.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">The case I'm studying is zero-knowledge, Range 2, i.e., CR3. Three
candidates, voter's preference is A>B>C, with midrange sincere rating for B.
We now know that in the two-voter case, the optimal vote is sincere.</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
No we don't. The "optimal vote" in your scenario is to max-rate A and
min-rate B and C. <br>
Comparing the two, the "truncated vote" beats the "sincere vote" in 3
opposing ballot situations.<br>
<br>
(1)B2 A0 C0: the truncated vote gives an AB tie while the sincere vote
elects B<br>
<br>
(2) B2 A1 C0: the truncated vote elects A while the sincere vote gives
an AB tie.<br>
<br>
(3) B2 C1 A0: the truncated vote gives an AB tie while the sincere vote
elects B.<br>
<br>
In all other cases the two give the same "voter satisfaction" score (by
giving the same result in all<br>
except one:)<br>
<br>
B2 C2 A0: the truncated vote gives an ABC tie while the sincere vote
elects B.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
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