[EM] replies to recent EM posts re voting-design puzzle

Chris Benham chrisjbenham at optusnet.com.au
Thu Jan 25 07:55:57 PST 2007

Warren Smith wrote:

>>Benham: Right. And how does a voter express an "infinitesimal" preference in
>the Range 0-99 that you advocate?
>--sorry, when I speak of "range voting" in mathematical analysis, I almost always mean
>"continuum range voting" where all real numbers in [0,1] are castable votes.

That is convenient for you, but I've also seen the claim made in 
propaganda apparently in support of  the version/s of  Range
you propose as a practical reform.


>    1. Each vote <MeaningOfVote.html> consists of a numerical score
>       within some range (say 0 to 99 <Why99.html>) for each candidate.
>       Simpler is 0 to 9 ("single digit range voting"). Voters may also
>       indicate "X" <Blanks.html> or "NO OPINION" <Blanks.html> if they
>       have no opinion about a candidate. Such votes don't affect that
>       candidate's average.
> UNAFFECTED BY CANDIDATE CLONING: <CandCloning.html> Consider the 
> situation where A has "clones" A_2 and A_3 . In the old "plurality 
> voting <Plurality.html>" system, the clones "split the vote" and lose. 
> In the "Borda voting <rangeVborda.html>" system, a party assures 
> victory merely by running enough clones. In contrast, in Range voting, 
> A is neither harmed nor helped. No more bitter enmity <Enmity.html> 
> between alike candidates

>As far as I am concerned, restriction to discrete sets such as {0,1,...,99} is
>not really a good idea and is only done for reasons of practicality (interface with
>old voting machines, etc).  I therefore prefer it if more and more 9s are allowed.  There is some
>reason to believe (in fact, precisely the sort of reason Benham speaks of) that about six 9s
>may be desirable.

I can see how by this trick you  achieve Strong FBC  and  your special  
version of   Clone Independence (ICC).

Chris Benham

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20070126/aa807a8a/attachment-0003.htm>

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list