[Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?

Ian Fellows ifellows at ucsd.edu
Thu Dec 20 14:22:48 PST 2007

I'm not aware of much in the way of serious opposition to the two-party
majority vote. in fact any reasonable methodology should reduce to the
majority vote when there are two candidates. The only method (to my
knowledge) that doesn't do this is range voting. www.rangevoting.org. Range
voting reduces to something similar to what you are saying. The problem lies
in giving numerical value to something as intangible as "satisfaction." How
do I measure my satisfaction relative to yours? Also, regardless of strongly
I feel (perhaps I only have a weak preference for one candidate),
strategically, I should give the maximum rating to the candidate I like to
maximize my happiness. And could this even be called strategic voting,
because there is no universal yardstick of happiness? Perhaps my weak
preference is comparable to your strong preference.

Ian Fellows
University of California, San Diego

p.s. The arguments on rangevoting.org are pretty fast and loose

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