[Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?

[Dave Ketchum]

"Condorcet" caught my eye - I think it deserves more attention but do not 
know how to get there.

I see Borda as more complex, without offering benefits to justify the 
cost.  I do not see counting Borda as a flavor of Condorcet.

Answering your questions:
      1- Condorcet is understandable if properly presented to voters and 
public.
      2- Still Condorcet.
      3- What is really that much better than Condorcet (based on what a 
voter normally knows on election day - all kinds of nonsense can be based 
on knowing what all others are doing, with your own plotting kept secret).
           Remember that Range allows stating numeric ratings - for which 
it must demand that the voter ASSIGN numeric ratings.
           I see Range as competitive, deserving careful analysis of 
differences - perhaps mixed with true comparison by voters.

Voting:
      Rank one or more candidates, thus indicating liking them better than 
the sea of unranked candidates.
      Use higher ranks for better liking (see voter instructions as to 
whether 3 is higher or lower than 4, as a rank).
      Equal ranks are permissible for equal liking.
      If, for example, you only wish to rank a couple, 4&5 would have the 
same meaning as 1&7 - it is relative values that matter, not magnitude of 
rank difference.
      If, for example, you like neither of the most likely winners, smart 
to rank at least one such, unless you see them deserving to tie.

Analyzing results:
     Results are publishable for whatever parts of a district are counted, 
looking much as a tournament score, giving results for each pair of 
candidates.

Cycles are a Condorcet complication.  Not expectable too often, for they 
result from 3 or more candidates approaching a conflicting tie for winning 
- such as A>B>G>A.

On Thu, 20 Dec 2007 11:37:15 -0800 Ian Fellows wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
>     I've been thinking a bit lately about the lack of Condorcet methods in
> public elections. I have written a rough outline of why Borda-elimination
> (Baldwin) is an attractive option for implementation in the public sphere.
> 
> If you are interested, check out:
> http://thefell.googlepages.com/statisticalsnipstprelections
> 
> Does anyone have thoughts on why Condorcet methods have not been used more
> often? Are there proponents here of different winner criteria (i.e. Borda),
> or is there a relatively strong consensus that if a Condorcet winner exists
> he should be elected? If so, what methodology do you think is 1.
> understandable by the public, 2. Theoretically justifiable, 3. Resistant to
> tactical voting
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Ian Fellows
> Statistician
> University of California, San Diego
> http://thefell.googlepages.com/
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  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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