[Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?

Ian Fellows ifellows at ucsd.edu
Thu Dec 20 11:37:15 PST 2007

Hi all,

    I've been thinking a bit lately about the lack of Condorcet methods in
public elections. I have written a rough outline of why Borda-elimination
(Baldwin) is an attractive option for implementation in the public sphere.

If you are interested, check out:

Does anyone have thoughts on why Condorcet methods have not been used more
often? Are there proponents here of different winner criteria (i.e. Borda),
or is there a relatively strong consensus that if a Condorcet winner exists
he should be elected? If so, what methodology do you think is 1.
understandable by the public, 2. Theoretically justifiable, 3. Resistant to
tactical voting


Ian Fellows
University of California, San Diego

-----Original Message-----
From: election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com
[mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com]On Behalf Of Rob
Sent: Thursday, December 13, 2007 7:10 PM
To: Election Methods Mailing List
Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] Nanson / Baldwin method winners are in
thesmith set

Ian wrote:
> Does anyone have a reference for the claim that the Nanson and Baldwin
> methods of iterative borda count elimination are in the smith set? I
> have seen it claimed in a couple places (i.e. wikipedia), but don't
> know where the result came from.

Here's how I explained it back in 2003:


but if you're asking for a published source, I don't know of one.

Rob LeGrand, psephologist
rob at approvalvoting.org
Citizens for Approval Voting

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