[Election-Methods] RE : Re: Is the Condorcet winner always the best?

Jonathan Lundell jlundell at pobox.com
Thu Dec 13 08:00:23 PST 2007

On Dec 11, 2007, at 6:17 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:

> A and C agree that B is better than their standard enemy.
> C voters will be happy to help install B, since this is better than  
> installing A.  A voters may be a bit unhappy, but they at least  
> avoided installing C.

That argument makes sense after the election, once the A or C voters  
know for certain that C or A, respectively, would have won had it not  
been for B. But the argument fails *before* the election. Given the  
implied utility function of this election, both A and C voters have a  
strong incentive to bury B if they think their own candidate has a  
good chance of winning outright.

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