[Election-Methods] RE : Re: Is the Condorcet winner always the best?

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Thu Dec 13 09:25:40 PST 2007


On Thu, 13 Dec 2007 08:00:23 -0800 Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> On Dec 11, 2007, at 6:17 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> 
> 
>>A and C agree that B is better than their standard enemy.
>>
>>C voters will be happy to help install B, since this is better than  
>>installing A.  A voters may be a bit unhappy, but they at least  
>>avoided installing C.
>>
> 
> 
> That argument makes sense after the election, once the A or C voters  
> know for certain that C or A, respectively, would have won had it not  
> been for B. But the argument fails *before* the election. Given the  
> implied utility function of this election, both A and C voters have a  
> strong incentive to bury B if they think their own candidate has a  
> good chance of winning outright.

Later in that same post of mine:
> 
>> Choices can be hard.  Get far enough from a tie and A or C will win.  If 
>> we manage a cycle we can debate the results of that.

IF A or C expected a solid win, the same voting would have been 
appropriate, since it would not prevent the win from being recognized.

Of course, there can be cycles - and hopefully the method will handle them 
well - but this does not seem to be the place to debate handling cycles.
-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.






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