[Election-Methods] RE : Re: Is the Condorcet winner always the best?
davek at clarityconnect.com
Thu Dec 13 09:25:40 PST 2007
On Thu, 13 Dec 2007 08:00:23 -0800 Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> On Dec 11, 2007, at 6:17 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>>A and C agree that B is better than their standard enemy.
>>C voters will be happy to help install B, since this is better than
>>installing A. A voters may be a bit unhappy, but they at least
>>avoided installing C.
> That argument makes sense after the election, once the A or C voters
> know for certain that C or A, respectively, would have won had it not
> been for B. But the argument fails *before* the election. Given the
> implied utility function of this election, both A and C voters have a
> strong incentive to bury B if they think their own candidate has a
> good chance of winning outright.
Later in that same post of mine:
>> Choices can be hard. Get far enough from a tie and A or C will win. If
>> we manage a cycle we can debate the results of that.
IF A or C expected a solid win, the same voting would have been
appropriate, since it would not prevent the win from being recognized.
Of course, there can be cycles - and hopefully the method will handle them
well - but this does not seem to be the place to debate handling cycles.
davek at clarityconnect.com people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
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