[Election-Methods] RE : Re: RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Sun Dec 2 11:06:19 PST 2007

Hi Diego,

--- Diego Santos <diego.renato at gmail.com> a écrit :
> 2007/11/30, Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>:
> > I agree, they should. But how can you promise it?
> I cannot do it. But pairwise sorted plurality, like DMC, gives more
> freedom
> than winning votes, because wv advantage over margins is based in
> truncation.

I think it's an illusion that you have less freedom with WV. You get to
rank more sincerely above the point that you truncate. It's more likely
that you can safely vote for your favorite candidate. Under margins it is a
good strategy to list a viable candidate as your favorite, because margins
doesn't really care how viable/strong a candidate is (i.e. how many votes
he receives in absolute terms) when sorting the defeats. Therefore you had
best try not to give your viable compromise choice any defeats.

And just because a method gives no incentive to truncate, doesn't mean you
can safely fill out the lower preferences sincerely, anyway.

Kevin Venzke

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