[Election-Methods] RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?
juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Sun Dec 2 14:23:11 PST 2007
On Nov 30, 2007, at 19:33 , Diego Santos wrote:
> I think that cloneproof violation is not severe when a method meets
> Smith. Probably near all majority rule cycles in contetions
> elections will be caused by burying. Then, additional resistance to
> this strategy will be desirable for a Condorcet method. If clone
> independence is desirable too, "Smith,IRV" is an alternative.
Why do you expect burying to be the main reason to cycles? Does this
apply to exceptionally contentious elections only or to all typical
The cycles may also be caused also by "random like" variation in
opinions in close races. Also natural cycles where the voter opinions
really are cyclic are quite possible.
Factors that may reduce the probability of strategic cycles are e.g.
changing opinion poll results before the elections and inability of
the voters to use the strategies in the strategically optimal way.
In general I tend to think that Condorcet methods are at their best
when strategic voting is not widespread or is not well organized
(=hopefully reduces to just noise). I really wouldn't like to see
general public use all the various Condorcet strategies that are
discussed on this list. In most cases Condorcet based methods are
maybe immune enough to strategic voting (especially when compared to
other commonly used methods). If this is the case then the best
method may be the one that performs best with sincere votes (possibly
slightly random and marginally strategic).
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