[Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

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From: Jobst Heitzig <heitzig-j at web.de>



> > Democratic decision systems avoid the necessity of fighting to prove
> > strength by assuming strength from numbers and making the necessary
> > accomodations.
> 
> In my opinion democracy in its basic meaning is not just a tool to 
> reproduce the result of a violent process without the violent process.

Taking that analogy further.  If there was a civil war between a 
55/45 split of the popluation, there would be lots of damage to both
sides.

The 'nuclear option' doesn't quite simulate that.  However, it does
impose some cost on the majority, without preventing them from doing
whatever they want.

Another proposal I had was that the majority should be allowed to pass
bills without a supermajority, but the minority had the authority to 
delay them.

This prevents the minority rule effect, while still giving the minority
some power.

For example,

A proposal to pass a bill (or maybe just to bring it to a vote) can be passed by

- 1 count with 2/3 support

- 2 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with 62.5% support in both counts

- 3 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with 57.5% support in all counts

- 4 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with 52.5% support in all counts

- 5 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with majority support in all counts

This allows 

a 1/3 minority to delay any bill by 1 month

a 37.5% minority to delay any bill by 2 months

a 42.5% minority to delay any bill by 3 months

a 47.5% minority to delay any bill by 4 months

>From the war analogy, a strong minority could delay the majority 
implementing its proposals immediately, even if they ultimately lost.

The next question is what would be acceptable to get the above rule 
implemented in the first place.  A referendum to modify the constitution
with 50%+1 support ?  

> > I'm not sure at all what a "just share of power" is. 
> 
> Me neither. But no power at all is definitely not a just share of power. 
> By posting on this topic I hope a discussion on this will eventually 
> begin.

In Northern Ireland, they have a power sharing executive.  Each member
of the assembly declares as a member of a party.  Cabinet positions 
are then allocated using the d'Hondt method.  The party leader can 
assign anyone from the assembly to the cabinet position.

This somewhat discriminates against smaller parties as the largest
parties always gets to pick first.  Assuming that the seats aren't
all roughly equal, the best one or 2 will be assigned before a small
party gets a chance.

Also, there has been some strategic moves from one party to another
after the election.

I would probably have implemented it using Jan's tree structure.  Groups
of parties can form a super-party (and maybe some party members could 
form a sub-party).  The seats are assigned to the group using d'Hondt
and then between the parties in the group.

The parties in NI would probably split into groups, unionist, nationalist
and neither.  Strategic party changes have been used to shift total
cabinet seats between unionist and nationalist.

> Nope. Depends on situation. In my example, 49% have no power at all. 
> That everyone has 1 vote does not mean everyone has the same power. It 
> is only a formal equality.
 
It is actually equal, one vote is perfectally replacable by another.
The problem exists outside the individual voter.

The problem is caused when you have a majority that is block voting.
This is kinda like a monopoly in the free market.  The standard 
benefits break down.

Logrolling means that in Congress, there is a certain amount of vote
trading which means that the result is closer to utility optimal.
However, they don't always (ever?) actually look at what they are 
giving up in exchange for votes later on.

Also, in a non-2 party system, there is often more than one potential
coalition.  This leads to negotiation between the parties and again
that should lead to all opinions being considered.

Ofc, in practice, only certain coalition permutations are possible.
This can lead to some parties not having much power.

However, if a coalition was to form that was seriously a problem, 
the party members could break ranks and give their support to the least
bad option so that the worst doesn't happen.  This is a safety valve
that doesn't really occur.  Alternatively, they could go for something
like Germany's current grand coalition.

Also, even in parties with a strong tradition of cohesion, if the
party leadership was to agree to something unacceptable, they 
could break ranks.

Finally, even if none of the above applies, you don't want to 
alienate potential future coalition partners to much.

> > And in pure democratic process, there are only two groups, and no
> > decision is made unless one outnumbers the others. I.e., if the Yes
> > faction outnumbers, the No faction, the motion prevails; otherwise,
> > it fails.
>
> What you call a "pure democratic process" is just what I claim is not 
> democratic at all, for the given reasons.

It depends on how the majority is organised.  In Northern Ireland, the 
unionist parties had greater than 50% of the assembly between them and 
they always voted as a block.  They didn't want to give nationalists
any power whatsoever, because the nationalists didn't support the 
existance of NI in the first place.

The result was oppression of the nationalists, but it wasn't very
democratic for the unionist general population either.  The party
leaders were able to appeal to the required unity in the face of 
the nationalists.  This increased their power.

This situation is clearly the standard tyranny of the majority.

However, if for any given citizen, around 50% of the time, they
are in the majority and 50% of the time they are in the minority, 
then there is no tyranny. (Mathematically, the average citizen
must be in the majority more often than the minority, but that doesn't
really change the point). Sometimes people agree with them and
sometimes not.

It comes down to the "floating voter".  These are the voters who
aren't committed to either side of the debate.  If on most issues, 
the floating voters hold balance of power, then you have a 
functioning democracy.  These are people who will listen to
the arguements and base their vote on the results and would likely
take into account negative effects on minorities.

> > Let me put it this way: you assert this, but you have done nothing
> > that establishes that the majority does *not* have the right to its
> > preference. 
> 
> The old ontological problem: One claims something exists, the other 
> claims it does not. Who must prove it?

Do rights pre-exist the ability to enforce them?  If I see a defenseless
person, do I have the right to take their stuff ?

Why is the answer NO?

Abraham Lincoln had an intersting take on it

"Let us have faith that right makes might"

He proposed the opposite to the might makes right conclusion.  However,
perhaps that is circular.

Taking right actions is what makes you mighty.  That doesn't necessarily
have to be taken to mean that any action which makes you mighty is 
necessarily right. 

There could be many routes to might of which doing the right thing is 
just 1 of them (hopefully the best way).

> > Every legislative body in actual existence, with actual sovereignty,
> > gives the majority this power. On what basis do you assert that this
> > is not a right?

I think this is an interesting question.  I am not entirely sure that
this is correct.

I made suggestions previously about having a formal vote trading mechanism
for the legislature.  It involved consumable votes that were lost if used
up.  Legislators would have to decide if the current issue was worth losing
power for later issues.

Assuming that the legislators accurately represent their electorate, this
should result in a maximisation of social utility.

> > Most societies establish boundaries over the power of the majority,
> > preventing it from oppressing minorities without justice. 
>
> But only insofar as certain basic rights of the minority shall not be 
> violated.
 
Also, minorities don't get control of any tax revenue.

What about something like picking 2 treasurers (say PR-STV or for a 
legislature, simple multi winner plurality).

Each legislator can pick one of the treasurers.  All spending must be 
authorised by one or other of them (or shared).  Funds accrue to each
account in proportion to the number of legislators supporting each 
one of them.

This gives a minority proportional control of the budget.  Ofc, things
like differential taxes could cause issues.  Also, a tax cut is the 
kinda the same as spending money (especially if it is targeted at one
group of society).

> > However, 
> > the majority can always circumvent these boundaries *if it cares to*.
> 
> If that is so in your society, I'm glad I don't live there... In mine a 
> mere majority cannot, say, change the constitution or violate it and 
> prevent the supreme court from intervening...

In Ireland, the constitution works that way.  A majority can do anything
it wants.  However, amendments happen relatively slowly and there isn't 
likely to be a complete overhaul (and if there was, it would probably
need multi-party support or it wouldn't pass).

However, the government can't prevent the supreme court from intervening.
Changing the constitution requires majority support of the people.
There have been times when the government have tried to get it changed
and failed.  The main one was to change the election method from PR-STV
to plurality.  First time it failed 52 to 48 and then when they asked 
again 10 years later, it failed 60 to 40.

People aren't evil, you don't want to give the government that much 
power.  I would hate to live in a country where there has been a complete
breakdown of trust.

Abortion is banned here, but the compromise was that the constitution 
explicitally allows travel to obtain one.  It is allowed in the UK, so
travel isn't that much of an issue.  This is somewhat typical
of the electorate, set it up so they can pretend the problem doesn't
exist.

A simple majority method of controlling the constitution cannot work
in a federal system.  In any system there must be a final arbitrar.
In federations, it is some kind of constitutional court.  However, in
a unitary stste, it can be referendum of the poeple.  Irish people can
effectively override the Supreme Court if it does something unacceptable.

This is one advantage of majority rule.  There is always a clear line
of authority.  All questions can be put to the people, who have the
final say.

I think this is an issue for the EU too.  The new not-a-constitution-really
is going to further empower the EU institutions.

I would have prefered a recognition of the authority of each member
state's Supreme Court with respect to interpretation of EU law, with
the understanding that it would normally follow the European Court.

> Therefore Random Ballot 
> is my "democratic benchmark" with which I compare possible outcomes.
 
Seems reasonable.  However, in a functional democracy, that shouldn't
be required.  Also, stability is also a social good.  In a parliamentary
system, the government is selected from the legislature.  Would you set
it up so that a motion of no-confidence had a 45% chance of passing ?

How do you pick the government ?

> I think we should start with the "democratic benchmark" instead of a 
> "majoritarian benchmark".

In fairness, most people would say that they are the same thing.  
Majority rule is historically a party of democracy.






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