[Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there'reonly 2 factions

[Paul Kislanko]

I finally figured out what was wrong with this question. 

The notion that C is a compromise, and even that electing the compromise is
desirable, is based upon gathering ballots range-style. 

I'd suggest that the zeroes in the last column are improbable if C is
acceptable to both  A and B voters. That all A-first voters like C almost as
much as A but don't like B (or all B voters like C almost as much as B but
don't like A) is so improbable I can't believe it would happen.

Present 100 separate ranked ballots that result in this semi-counted
conclusion.

-----Original Message-----
From: election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com
[mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of Jobst
Heitzig
Sent: Wednesday, August 22, 2007 1:55 AM
To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
Subject: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when
there'reonly 2 factions

A common situation: 2 factions & 1 good compromise.

The goal: Make sure the compromise wins.

The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority.

A concrete example: true ratings are
   55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0
   45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0

THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)!

The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically...

Good luck & have fun :-)

Jobst
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