<font face="Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">Seems there's something seriously broken with copy/paste on AIM mail.</font><br>
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<font face="Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif"></font>From: Jobst Heitzig <heitzig-j@web.de><br>
<br>
<div id="AOLMsgPart_2_758f2bf0-bc1f-446d-b099-033d6f22ec09" style="margin: 0px; font-family: Tahoma,Verdana,Arial,Sans-Serif; font-size: 12px; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><pre style="font-size: 9pt;"><tt>> > Democratic decision systems avoid the necessity of fighting to prove<br>
> > strength by assuming strength from numbers and making the necessary<br>
> > accomodations.<br>
> <br>
> In my opinion democracy in its basic meaning is not just a tool to <br>
> reproduce the result of a violent process without the violent process.<br>
<br>
Taking that analogy further. If there was a civil war between a <br>
55/45 split of the popluation, there would be lots of damage to both<br>
sides.<br>
<br>
The 'nuclear option' doesn't quite simulate that. However, it does<br>
impose some cost on the majority, without preventing them from doing<br>
whatever they want.<br>
<br>
Another proposal I had was that the majority should be allowed to pass<br>
bills without a supermajority, but the minority had the authority to <br>
delay them.<br>
<br>
This prevents the minority rule effect, while still giving the minority<br>
some power.<br>
<br>
For example,<br>
<br>
A proposal to pass a bill (or maybe just to bring it to a vote) can be passed by<br>
<br>
- 1 count with 2/3 support<br>
<br>
- 2 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with 62.5% support in both counts<br>
<br>
- 3 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with 57.5% support in all counts<br>
<br>
- 4 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with 52.5% support in all counts<br>
<br>
- 5 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with majority support in all counts<br>
<br>
This allows <br>
<br>
a 1/3 minority to delay any bill by 1 month<br>
<br>
a 37.5% minority to delay any bill by 2 months<br>
<br>
a 42.5% minority to delay any bill by 3 months<br>
<br>
a 47.5% minority to delay any bill by 4 months<br>
<br>
>From the war analogy, a strong minority could delay the majority <br>
implementing its proposals immediately, even if they ultimately lost.<br>
<br>
The next question is what would be acceptable to get the above rule <br>
implemented in the first place. A referendum to modify the constitution<br>
with 50%+1 support ? <br>
<br>
> > I'm not sure at all what a "just share of power" is. <br>
> <br>
> Me neither. But no power at all is definitely not a just share of power. <br>
> By posting on this topic I hope a discussion on this will eventually <br>
> begin.<br>
<br>
In Northern Ireland, they have a power sharing executive. Each member<br>
of the assembly declares as a member of a party. Cabinet positions <br>
are then allocated using the d'Hondt method. The party leader can <br>
assign anyone from the assembly to the cabinet position.<br>
<br>
This somewhat discriminates against smaller parties as the largest<br>
parties always gets to pick first. Assuming that the seats aren't<br>
all roughly equal, the best one or 2 will be assigned before a small<br>
party gets a chance.<br>
<br>
Also, there has been some strategic moves from one party to another<br>
after the election.<br>
<br>
I would probably have implemented it using Jan's tree structure. Groups<br>
of parties can form a super-party (and maybe some party members could <br>
form a sub-party). The seats are assigned to the group using d'Hondt<br>
and then between the parties in the group.<br>
<br>
The parties in NI would probably split into groups, unionist, nationalist<br>
and neither. Strategic party changes have been used to shift total<br>
cabinet seats between unionist and nationalist.<br>
<br>
> Nope. Depends on situation. In my example, 49% have no power at all. <br>
> That everyone has 1 vote does not mean everyone has the same power. It <br>
> is only a formal equality.<br>
<br>
It is actually equal, one vote is perfectally replacable by another.<br>
The problem exists outside the individual voter.<br>
<br>
The problem is caused when you have a majority that is block voting.<br>
This is kinda like a monopoly in the free market. The standard <br>
benefits break down.<br>
<br>
Logrolling means that in Congress, there is a certain amount of vote<br>
trading which means that the result is closer to utility optimal.<br>
However, they don't always (ever?) actually look at what they are <br>
giving up in exchange for votes later on.<br>
<br>
Also, in a non-2 party system, there is often more than one potential<br>
coalition. This leads to negotiation between the parties and again<br>
that should lead to all opinions being considered.<br>
<br>
Ofc, in practice, only certain coalition permutations are possible.<br>
This can lead to some parties not having much power.<br>
<br>
However, if a coalition was to form that was seriously a problem, <br>
the party members could break ranks and give their support to the least<br>
bad option so that the worst doesn't happen. This is a safety valve<br>
that doesn't really occur. Alternatively, they could go for something<br>
like Germany's current grand coalition.<br>
<br>
Also, even in parties with a strong tradition of cohesion, if the<br>
party leadership was to agree to something unacceptable, they <br>
could break ranks.<br>
<br>
Finally, even if none of the above applies, you don't want to <br>
alienate potential future coalition partners to much.<br>
<br>
> > And in pure democratic process, there are only two groups, and no<br>
> > decision is made unless one outnumbers the others. I.e., if the Yes<br>
> > faction outnumbers, the No faction, the motion prevails; otherwise,<br>
> > it fails.<br>
><br>
> What you call a "pure democratic process" is just what I claim is not <br>
> democratic at all, for the given reasons.<br>
<br>
It depends on how the majority is organised. In Northern Ireland, the <br>
unionist parties had greater than 50% of the assembly between them and <br>
they always voted as a block. They didn't want to give nationalists<br>
any power whatsoever, because the nationalists didn't support the <br>
existance of NI in the first place.<br>
<br>
The result was oppression of the nationalists, but it wasn't very<br>
democratic for the unionist general population either. The party<br>
leaders were able to appeal to the required unity in the face of <br>
the nationalists. This increased their power.<br>
<br>
This situation is clearly the standard tyranny of the majority.<br>
<br>
However, if for any given citizen, around 50% of the time, they<br>
are in the majority and 50% of the time they are in the minority, <br>
then there is no tyranny. (Mathematically, the average citizen<br>
must be in the majority more often than the minority, but that doesn't<br>
really change the point). Sometimes people agree with them and<br>
sometimes not.<br>
<br>
It comes down to the "floating voter". These are the voters who<br>
aren't committed to either side of the debate. If on most issues, <br>
the floating voters hold balance of power, then you have a <br>
functioning democracy. These are people who will listen to<br>
the arguements and base their vote on the results and would likely<br>
take into account negative effects on minorities.<br>
<br>
> > Let me put it this way: you assert this, but you have done nothing<br>
> > that establishes that the majority does *not* have the right to its<br>
> > preference. <br>
> <br>
> The old ontological problem: One claims something exists, the other <br>
> claims it does not. Who must prove it?<br>
<br>
Do rights pre-exist the ability to enforce them? If I see a defenseless<br>
person, do I have the right to take their stuff ?<br>
<br>
Why is the answer NO?<br>
<br>
Abraham Lincoln had an intersting take on it<br>
<br>
"Let us have faith that right makes might"<br>
<br>
He proposed the opposite to the might makes right conclusion. However,<br>
perhaps that is circular.<br>
<br>
Taking right actions is what makes you mighty. That doesn't necessarily<br>
have to be taken to mean that any action which makes you mighty is <br>
necessarily right. <br>
<br>
There could be many routes to might of which doing the right thing is <br>
just 1 of them (hopefully the best way).<br>
<br>
</tt><tt>> > Every legislative body in actual existence, with actual sovereignty,<br>
> > gives the majority this power. On what basis do you assert that this<br>
> > is not a right?<br>
<br>
I think this is an interesting question. I am not entirely sure that<br>
this is correct.<br>
<br>
I made suggestions previously about having a formal vote trading mechanism<br>
for the legislature. It involved consumable votes that were lost if used<br>
up. Legislators would have to decide if the current issue was worth losing<br>
power for later issues.<br>
<br>
Assuming that the legislators accurately represent their electorate, this<br>
should result in a maximisation of social utility.<br>
<br>
> > Most societies establish boundaries over the power of the majority,<br>
> > preventing it from oppressing minorities without justice. <br>
><br>
> But only insofar as certain basic rights of the minority shall not be <br>
> violated.<br>
<br>
Also, minorities don't get control of any tax revenue.<br>
<br>
What about something like picking 2 treasurers (say PR-STV or for a <br>
legislature, simple multi winner plurality).<br>
<br>
Each legislator can pick one of the treasurers. All spending must be <br>
authorised by one or other of them (or shared). Funds accrue to each<br>
account in proportion to the number of legislators supporting each <br>
one of them.<br>
<br>
This gives a minority proportional control of the budget. Ofc, things<br>
like differential taxes could cause issues. Also, a tax cut is the <br>
kinda the same as spending money (especially if it is targeted at one<br>
group of society).<br>
<br>
> > However, <br>
> > the majority can always circumvent these boundaries *if it cares to*.<br>
> <br>
> If that is so in your society, I'm glad I don't live there... In mine a <br>
> mere majority cannot, say, change the constitution or violate it and <br>
> prevent the supreme court from intervening...<br>
<br>
In Ireland, the constitution works that way. A majority can do anything<br>
it wants. However, amendments happen relatively slowly and there isn't <br>
likely to be a complete overhaul (and if there was, it would probably<br>
need multi-party support or it wouldn't pass).<br>
<br>
However, the government can't prevent the supreme court from intervening.<br>
Changing the constitution requires majority support of the people.<br>
There have been times when the government have tried to get it changed<br>
and failed. The main one was to change the election method from PR-STV<br>
to plurality. First time it failed 52 to 48 and then when they asked <br>
again 10 years later, it failed 60 to 40.<br>
<br>
People aren't evil, you don't want to give the government that much <br>
power. I would hate to live in a country where there has been a complete<br>
breakdown of trust.<br>
<br>
Abortion is banned here, but the compromise was that the constitution <br>
explicitally allows travel to obtain one. It is allowed in the UK, so<br>
travel isn't that much of an issue. This is somewhat typical<br>
of the electorate, set it up so they can pretend the problem doesn't<br>
exist.<br>
<br>
A simple majority method of controlling the constitution cannot work<br>
in a federal system. In any system there must be a final arbitrar.<br>
In federations, it is some kind of constitutional court. However, in<br>
a unitary stste, it can be referendum of the poeple. Irish people can<br>
effectively override the Supreme Court if it does something unacceptable.<br>
<br>
This is one advantage of majority rule. There is always a clear line<br>
of authority. All questions can be put to the people, who have the<br>
final say.<br>
<br>
I think this is an issue for the EU too. The new not-a-constitution-really<br>
is going to further empower the EU institutions.<br>
<br>
I would have prefered a recognition of the authority of each member<br>
state's Supreme Court with respect to interpretation of EU law, with<br>
the understanding that it would normally follow the European Court.<br>
<br>
> Therefore Random Ballot <br>
> is my "democratic benchmark" with which I compare possible outcomes.<br>
<br>
Seems reasonable. However, in a functional democracy, that shouldn't<br>
be required. Also, stability is also a social good. In a parliamentary<br>
system, the government is selected from the legislature. Would you set<br>
it up so that a motion of no-confidence had a 45% chance of passing ?<br>
<br>
How do you pick the government ?<br>
<br>
> I think we should start with the "democratic benchmark" instead of a <br>
> "majoritarian benchmark".<br>
<br>
In fairness, most people would say that they are the same thing. <br>
Majority rule is historically a party of democracy.<br>
<br>
</tt></pre></div>
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