[Election-Methods] Fwd: RE : Corrected "strategy in Condorcet" section, Chris

[Chris Benham]

Kevin Venzke wrote:

>>>I think a better method that would achieve everything you are  
>>>trying to do with your method (technically
>>>if not "psychologically") would be this:
>>>
>>>"1) Voters indicate one Favourite and also Approve as many  
>>>candidates as they like.
>>>
>>>2) Any candidate voted as favourite on 50% or more of the ballots  
>>>wins.
>>>
>>>3) Eliminate any candidate whose max. approval opposition score is  
>>>greater than 50%, unless that is all
>>>the candidates.  [I'm not sure if that's possible].
>>>      
>>>
>
>Nope, that's not possible. You can only get this score if someone else
>has majority approval and you don't. It's an MD filter really.
>
>  
>
>>>4) Of the remaining candidates, the two voted as favourite on the  
>>>most ballots go to the second round."
>>>
>>>This uses a more expressive ballot and mainly confines the split- 
>>>vote problem to the "top" of the ballot.
>>>So the normal recommended strategy in the 3 viable candidates  
>>>scenario would be vote the most preferred
>>>of the 3 as favourite, and approve all the candidates you prefer to  
>>>the least preferred of  the 3.
>>>
>>>What do you think of that?
>>>      
>>>
>
>I've had this exact thought... I agree that on paper this should be 
>similar in effect and better.
>  
>
Kevin,
Thinking about this a bit more, why not expand this into a fully-fledged 
3-slot method?

"Middle-slot votes count only as approval for calculating max. approval 
opposition scores.
Candidates with a Max. AO score greater than 50% of the valid ballots 
are eliminated.
Elect the remaining candidate with most top-slot votes."

I think that would be like a CDTT method. Wouldn't we then have a method 
that meets
Minimal Defense, a variety of Later-no-Harm (middle-rating candidates 
can't harm the voter's top-rated
candidates),FBC and  mono-raise; but fails Plurality,  3-slot Majority 
for Solid Coalitions, and Irrelevant Ballots,
and has a sort of random-fill incentive?

What do you think of that? It seems so Venzke-like, have you ever 
proposed it?

Chris Benham






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