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Kevin Venzke wrote:<br>
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<pre wrap="">I think a better method that would achieve everything you are
trying to do with your method (technically
if not "psychologically") would be this:
"1) Voters indicate one Favourite and also Approve as many
candidates as they like.
2) Any candidate voted as favourite on 50% or more of the ballots
wins.
3) Eliminate any candidate whose max. approval opposition score is
greater than 50%, unless that is all
the candidates. [I'm not sure if that's possible].
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Nope, that's not possible. You can only get this score if someone else
has majority approval and you don't. It's an MD filter really.
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<pre wrap="">4) Of the remaining candidates, the two voted as favourite on the
most ballots go to the second round."
This uses a more expressive ballot and mainly confines the split-
vote problem to the "top" of the ballot.
So the normal recommended strategy in the 3 viable candidates
scenario would be vote the most preferred
of the 3 as favourite, and approve all the candidates you prefer to
the least preferred of the 3.
What do you think of that?
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I've had this exact thought... I agree that on paper this should be
similar in effect and better.
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Kevin,<br>
Thinking about this a bit more, why not expand this into a
fully-fledged 3-slot method?<br>
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"Middle-slot votes count only as approval for calculating max. approval
opposition scores.<br>
Candidates with a Max. AO score greater than 50% of the valid ballots
are eliminated.<br>
Elect the remaining candidate with most top-slot votes."<br>
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I think that would be like a CDTT method. Wouldn't we then have a
method that meets<br>
Minimal Defense, a variety of Later-no-Harm (middle-rating candidates
can't harm the voter's top-rated<br>
candidates),FBC and mono-raise; but fails Plurality, 3-slot Majority
for Solid Coalitions, and Irrelevant Ballots,<br>
and has a sort of random-fill incentive?<br>
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What do you think of that? It seems so Venzke-like, have you ever
proposed it? <br>
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Chris Benham<br>
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