[Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff

[Diego Renato]

2007/8/18, Gervase Lam:
>
> > [With a reweight of 0 a] concern [is] that if you approve your
> compromise
> > candidate, who ends up being the most approved, you can weaken your
> votes
> > for your favorite candidate and cause him to fail to qualify for the
> > second round.
>
> The ideal way to sort out this concern would be have the reweighting be
> 1 instead of 0.  However, having a reweighting of 1 means that a faction
> could get a turkey candidate into the second round, as Chris has pointed
> out.  The compromise between a reweighting of 0 and 1 is 1/2!
> Personally, I agree with dropping rule #2 but would keep the reweighting
> at 1/2.


I devised an example where a reweighting of 0 results CW fail to run second
round (>> is approval cutoff):

33: Right >> Center > Left
8: R > C >> L
7: C > R >> L
8: C >> R > L
8: C >> L > R
8: C > L >> R
7: L > C >> R
21: L >> C > R

First count: R: 48; C: 46; L: 36
Second count: C: 38,5; L: 36 (IAR), C: 31; L: 36 (Chris' proposal)

Under IAR, candidates from right and center compete in the second round, and
centrist wins. Under Crhis' method, the competitors are from right and left,
and rightist wins.

I agree that dropping rule #2 is better. However, as Dave said, runoffs are
expensive. In parliamentary systems, 50%+ support is sufficient to maintain
a head of government, because this i thought a winner in same conditions is
not a bad outcome.
________________________________
Diego Santos
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