[Election-Methods] RE : Corrected "strategy in Condorcet" section

[Juho]

In the last October case also equal ranking was allowed in addition  
to the other strengths of preference.

Juho


On Aug 16, 2007, at 7:24 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

> At 03:24 PM 8/15/2007, Juho wrote:
>
>> Last October I wrote about ranked preferences, i.e. ballots like
>> A>>B>C>D>>>E. That allows the voter in a way to define different
>> approval like divisions. I think the concept is theoretically pretty
>> but I'm not sure if the full set of capabilities is ever needed in
>> practice and if the complexity can be justified with the achieved
>> benefits.
>
> Ranked ballots that allow equal ranking are vastly superior in  
> performance to those that prohibit it, for a number of reasons, one  
> of which can be addressed with automated voting equipment, others  
> can't.
>
> And, of course, there are reasons to avoid "automated voting  
> equipment," generally.
>
> Three reasons are:
>
> (1) If you prohibit overvoting at a rank, you will see an increased  
> number of spoiled ballots, for various reasons. Some of them are  
> purely errors, others are deliberate. Voters don't always  
> understand the rules, and I've never seen a ballot that said, "Vote  
> for more than one and your ballot will be invalidated." (Sometimes  
> the rules, as I have seen with IRV rules, only discard votes at the  
> equal ranked level or below.) Allowing equal ranking preserves more  
> of voter intent than discarding the overvotes.
>
> (Generally. Consider Florida 2000; due to misleading ballot design,  
> there were many Gore/Buchanan overvotes. Counting the votes would  
> have given some extra votes to Buchanan, which would have been  
> harmless. Almost certainly, these were votes intended for Gore.  
> Now, it could be argued that they were intended for Buchanan --  
> though that's very unlikely in the case -- and thus that it would  
> be unfair to give the votes to Gore. However, by presuming that the  
> voter erred and that we cannot therefore discern the voter's  
> intent, we discard what the voter has actually expressed. Other  
> votes, for example, may have been cast for Buchanan and the voter  
> did not realize that the ballot was misleading. We should take the  
> ballots as writ.)
>
> (2) Forced ranking introduces noise.
>
> (3) Allowing equal ranking brings the method closer in S.U.  
> maximization to Range. Generally, ranked methods force a single  
> preference step; except at the bottom, no other preference  
> distinction is permitted. Allowing equal preference turns a ranked  
> method into Approval, should a voter decide to only use the first  
> rank. Or into Approval at any lower rank. I.e., this is my  
> Favorite, but if not this one, then any of these would be  
> acceptable. This could fix center squeeze in IRV.
>


		
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