[Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting

[Juho]

On Aug 6, 2007, at 1:28 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

> At 05:41 PM 8/3/2007, Juho wrote:
>> On Aug 2, 2007, at 16:38 , Warren Smith wrote:
>>> If range voters max and min the two perceived-frontrunner
>>> candidates, then they gain almost all the strategic advantages
>>> of approval voting, while still allowing quite a lot
>>> of honesty concerning other candidates.
>>>
>>>
>>> *2. So for example, if
>>> 49% voted Bush=99, Gore=0, Nader=53(avg), and
>>> 49% voted Gore=99, Bush=0, Nader=53(avg), and
>>> 2% voted Nader=99, Gore=20, Bush=0
>>> then Nader would win.
>>>
>>> This structure is a realistic possibility that totally  
>>> contradicts the
>>> assertion RV
>>> "gives power to the candidate whose supporters
>>> have the most black and white, polarized view of the world."
>>> In this case, Nader is winning despite a severe lack of polarized
>>> Nader supporters.
>>
>> How about other strategic opportunities like 10 Gore supporters
>> giving Nader 0 points (instead of 53) and thereby making their
>> favourite (Gore) the winner?
>
> That Range gives Nader an opportunity doesn't guarantee Nader a  
> win? Should it?
>
> In this case, we have an *average* vote from the Bush and Gore  
> supporters, both, of 53%. The Nader supporters voted quite strongly  
> for Nader -- 20% for Gore is quite a weak vote, given how strongly  
> both the Repubs and Dems supported Nader. Already.
>
> Note that the scenario described quite probably already has "10"  
> Gore voters doing that. Probably quite a bit more than ten! I think  
> Juho missed that the Nader votes were averages.
>
> Most election methods would give this election to Gore, period.  
> Gore is the Condorcet winner. But Nader is arguably the best  
> winner. In a situation like this, I'd trigger a runoff between Gore  
> and Bush.
>
> This constant argument that Range gives too much power to extreme  
> voters is truly bizarre.

Bush and Gore have the same number of first preference votes and the  
voters are planning to give (maybe strategically) max and min votes  
to these candidates. Nader supporters however seem to prefer Gore to  
Bush, which makes the Gore position stronger.

With the given numbers (that are maybe from a poll) this will be a  
very close race and therefore anything can happen at the election  
day. But if we assume that the given numbers will hold the Gore  
supporters have a strategic option to give Nader 0 points and win.  
Isn't this giving more power to Gore supporters if they are more  
extreme?

I don't know if it is exactly true that "Range gives too much power  
to extreme voters" (since less extreme voters can also exaggerate if  
they consider that to be the normal recommended way to vote) but it  
often seems to encourage voters to give extreme/exaggerated/Approval  
like votes.

(Condorcet btw seems to be closer to electing Nader.)

Juho


> Rather, what has actually happened here is that the system gives  
> Nader a chance. If enough voters vote against him, ranking him  
> equal last, which is what was proposed, he's going to lose with  
> either Range or a Condorcet method. However, if I had my 'druthers,  
> with the winner, Gore, only getting 49% of the first place votes, a  
> runoff might be a great idea. Who would win? You sure can't tell  
> from the data for sure.... Unless we assume those are sincere and  
> accurate expressions of relative utility, in which case Nader has a  
> chance.
>
> Note that the Reps seem to prefer Nader, greatly, to Gore. So I'd  
> predict Nader would win.
>
>
>
>
>> Juho








		
___________________________________________________________ 
Try the all-new Yahoo! Mail. "The New Version is radically easier to use" – The Wall Street Journal 
http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html