[Election-Methods] Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting
Juho
juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Fri Aug 3 14:41:54 PDT 2007
On Aug 2, 2007, at 16:38 , Warren Smith wrote:
>> W.Schudy:
>> Summary: I believe it's better to force everyone to vote
>> strategically
>> (approval) than to give power to the candidate whose supporters
>> have the most black and white, polarized view of the world.
> If range voters max and min the two perceived-frontrunner
> candidates, then they gain almost all the strategic advantages
> of approval voting, while still allowing quite a lot
> of honesty concerning other candidates.
>
>
> *2. So for example, if
> 49% voted Bush=99, Gore=0, Nader=53(avg), and
> 49% voted Gore=99, Bush=0, Nader=53(avg), and
> 2% voted Nader=99, Gore=20, Bush=0
> then Nader would win.
>
> This structure is a realistic possibility that totally contradicts the
> assertion RV
> "gives power to the candidate whose supporters
> have the most black and white, polarized view of the world."
> In this case, Nader is winning despite a severe lack of polarized
> Nader supporters.
How about other strategic opportunities like 10 Gore supporters
giving Nader 0 points (instead of 53) and thereby making their
favourite (Gore) the winner?
Juho
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